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The Duty of Assistance: An Evaluation of it Robustness and Sufficiency 
Kathryn Nicole Oliver 
In his work The Law of Peoples, John Rawls is commonly criticized by his 
cosmopolitan opponents for leaving out an international difference principle. Much 
concern has been voiced in regards to Rawls's rejection of a global principle of 
distributive justice despite his argumentation for a distributive principle in his domestic 
theory. Instead, the only principle that bears any resemblance to an international 
difference principle and relates directly to economic redistribution between peoples is 
what Rawls calls a duty of assistance. 
In this Thesis, I will argue that many critiques of Rawls are not sufficiently 
charitable toward Rawls's international duty of assistance and do not fully appreciate the 
potential demands that this duty, if actualized, may require. I argue that once one 
evaluates the demands that the duty of assistance places upon members in Rawls's Society 
of Peoples, one can reasonably conclude that the duty of assistance is robust and 
furthermore reasonably sufficient. Given that the cut-off point of the duty of assistance 
demands that members in the Society of Peoples must aid a burdened people until a) the 
basic needs of the individuals within the burdened society are met and b) the once 
burdened people can be considered a reasonably well-ordered and equal standing member 
in the Society of Peoples that is politically autonomous, self-sufficient, and self-
i i i 
determining, I will argue that the duty of assistance is a demand that is not to be 
underestimated and has the potential to be both robust and sufficient. 
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In his work The Law of Peoples, John Rawls is commonly criticized by his 
cosmopolitan opponents for leaving out an international difference principle. Much 
concern has been voiced in regards to Rawls's rejection of a global principle of 
distributive justice despite his argumentation for a distributive principle in his domestic 
theory.1 Instead, the only principle that bears any resemblance to an international 
difference principle and relates directly to economic redistribution between peoples is 
what Rawls calls a duty of assistance. 
In this Thesis, I will argue that many critiques of Rawls are not sufficiently 
charitable toward Rawls's international duty of assistance. I argue that once one evaluates 
the demands that the duty of assistance places upon members in Rawls's Society of 
Peoples, and given Rawls's larger theoretical framework, one can reasonably conclude 
that the duty of assistance is robust and, furthermore, reasonably sufficient. Given that the 
target and cut-off point of the duty of assistance demands that members in the society of 
peoples must aid a burdened people until a) the basic needs of the individuals within the 
burdened society are met and b) the once burden people can be considered a reasonably 
well-ordered and equal standing member in the Society of Peoples that is politically 
Please refer to A Theory ojJustice (1971) §13:65-73, Political Liberalism (1993) 282, and Justice as 
Fairness: A Restatement (2001) §13:42-50 and §18:61-66. Here a more in depth account of Rawls's 
difference principle can be found. Briefly, the difference principle locates in Rawls's theory a duty of 
distributive justice. The difference principle stipulates that the only justifiable inequalities are those that 
are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society . 
1 
autonomous, self-sufficient, and self-determining, I will argue that the duty of assistance 
is a demand that is not to be underestimated and for Rawls's Society of Peoples, it has the 
potential to be both robust and sufficient. 
Much of the earlier parts of this work will focus on fully flushing out Rawls's duty 
of assistance and other key aspects to his political theory so as to provide a common 
background of understanding for the chapters that will follow. Next, my focus will turn to 
charges made against Rawls's by his cosmopolitan critics, in particular Kok-Chor Tan 
who is fairly sympathetic to Rawls's position. After such criticisms are considered I will 
seek to explore and defend the robustness2 of the duty of assistance along with its 
By robustness, normatively speaking, 1 am using the term to signify the quality of being able to 
withstand change. Robustness as used for the purposes of this work, connotatively refers to possessing a 
quality of endurance whereby the subject in question will be able to adequately cope with stresses, 
pressures, or changes in procedure and, or circumstance in a given environment and political climate. 
By applying this understanding of robustness to the duty of assistance an evaluation of whether the duty 
will be able to remain effective, reasonable, and acceptable under different social and political 
arrangements, be it conditions of scarcity or abundance for example, will be called into question. My 
intended use of robustness, then refers to the capability to endure through variations, at times 
unpredictable variations in an operating environment with minimal damage, alteration or loss of 
functionality. Robustness when applied to the duty of assistance will help us assess whether the duty, as 
distinguished by Rawls, has the longevity to withstand change, both expected and unexpected. An 
evaluation of robustness calls us to question whether a principle, such as the duty of assistance, has the 
breadth to be reasonable and acceptable cross-culturally in varying political arrangements, and whether 
it will remain effective and adequate to account for future generations. 
2 
sufficiency3 while considering contributions made to this conversation by Samuel 
Freeman, who is a defender of the Rawlsian view. My third chapter will seek to provide a 
justification for the broad concept of basic needs used by Rawls. Additionally, my third 
chapter will explore the idea of Rawlsian toleration. Here I will seek to defend Rawls's 
controversial assumption that it is possible for a well-ordered people, under the ideal 
conditions that govern the Society of Peoples, to exercise political autonomy, be 
economically self-sustaining, and adequately account for their individual citizens' basic 
needs while managing to avoid being subject to manipulation by external forces. 
In the end, I will conclude that when one comes to appreciate that the duty of 
assistance's target is to ensure that the basic needs of a people's citizens are met within 
the given burdened society coupled with the insistence by Rawls that political autonomy 
and independence must be achieved by the once burdened society in order for it to 
qualify as decent, one could reasonably accept the duty of assistance as a robust and 
For the purposes of this work I will take sufficiency to signify an evaluation of possible distributions 
made popular by authors such as Harry Frankfurt and Roger Crisp. For one of the most influential 
defences of the doctrine of sufficiency refer to Frankfurt, Harry. "Equality as Moral Ideal," Ethics 98 
(1987): 21-43. For a more recent defence, see Crisp, Roger. "Equality, Priority, and Compassion," 
Ethics 113 (2003):745-763, and "Egalitarianism and Compassion," Ethics 114 (2004): 119-126. 
Generally speaking, the doctrine of sufficiency holds that what matters is whether individuals have 
enough not to fall below some critical threshold of advantage. Typically an account of sufficiency 
endorses both: a) positive thesis - that highlights the importance of people living above a certain 
threshold, and b) negative thesis - that denies the importance of certain additional requirements. 
Frankfurt agues that "What is important from the view of morality is not that everyone should have the 
same, but that each should have enough" ("Equality as a Moral Ideal", 21). 
3 
reasonably sufficient demand to be executed if need be within the Society of Peoples. 
However, despite the possible robustness of the duty of assistance and given that it is 
contingent upon both a people's capacity for political autonomy and having the basic 
needs of its citizens met so that they are capable to take advantage of the opportunities 
within their given society, I recognize that there is much need for clarification as to what 
these contingencies entail on both my part and on Rawls's behalf if my argument is to be 
convincing and this will be the focus the later part of this work. 
4 
Chapter 1 - Rawls's Law of Peoples and His Duty of Assistance 
To properly evaluate the sufficiency and robustness of Rawls's duty of assistance, 
we first need to examine its theoretical foundations. According to Rawls, a Law of 
Peoples,' is "a particular political conception of right and justice that applies to the 
principles and norms of international law and practise".2 In Part I of The Law of Peoples, 
Rawls develops the content of a Law of Peoples by extending his methodology used in 
establishing the principles of domestic justice in his conception of justice as fairness3 to 
the international domain. In Part II, Rawls discusses the toleration and inclusion of 
nonliberal peoples into the Society of Peoples. In Part III, Rawls addresses cases of 
nonideal theory. In this final part Rawls offers a commentary on just war theory. 
However, and more importantly for the purposes of this project, he addresses the case of 
burdened societies and discusses matters of distributive justice among peoples. This 
chapter will expound upon Rawls's approach to ideal theory in which he extends his 
social contract theory to the international domain, offers a defence of the duty of 
assistance to aid burdened societies, and additionally rejects an international difference 
principle. 
Before one evaluates Rawls's duty of assistance there are many theoretical aspects 
central to Rawls's The Law of Peoples, and furthermore; in his theories related to 
Political Liberalism and a Theory of Justice that precede the construction of such a 
principle that must be identified and understood. Having a firm understanding of the 
1
 See Rawls, John (1999). The Law of Peoples (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA). According to 
Rawls, there is not a single possible Law of Peoples, but rather a family of such laws that satisfy the 
criteria he offers, "a Law of Peoples" and "the Law of Peoples" can be used interchangeably. See p. 4ff. 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 3. 
3
 See Rawls, John (1999), A Theory of Justice (Revised Edition), (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press); (1993), Political Liberalism, (New York: Columbia University Press). 
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methodology that Rawls relies on in his conception of ideal theory to derive a realistic 
Utopia is the first step that we must clarify. The second critical feature that this chapter 
will examine is how Rawls sets up his ideal case to apply between well-ordered liberal 
democracies and reasonably decent well-ordered societies. Understanding how Rawls 
distinguishes the features of these types of societies is essential to our evaluation of the 
robustness and sufficiency of his duty of assistance. The next critical area of Rawls's 
theory that will be discussed is his application of the 'Original Position'. Once we have 
acquired an understanding of the construction of the social contract theory utilized by 
Rawls in formulating The Law of Peoples, we will be equipped with the necessary tools 
to understand how Rawls was able to derive the duty of assistance along with his seven 
other principles of justice for the international case. Following this discussion, I will relay 
the guidelines, both the target and cut-off point, of the duty of assistance as distinguished 
by Rawls. Furthermore, a discussion of some of the potential implications that the duty of 
assistance if executed would require will be offered. 
Ideal Theory and Rawls's Realistic Utopia 
The first critical aspect that must be identified is that Rawls derives his eight 
principles of justice in the Law of Peoples from the ideal case.4 Emphasis needs to be 
placed upon what Rawls, conceives and defines as a 'realistic Utopia'. A realistically 
Utopian society for Rawls, "depicts an achievable social world that combines political 
right and justice for all liberal and decent peoples in a Society of Peoples".5 The Law of 
Peoples is realistic in that it could and may exist. It is also Utopian and highly desirable 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 37. 
5
 Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 4. From more on what constitutes a realistic Utopia also refer to 4-12, 
29-30,44-45, 124-127. 
6 
because it joins reasonableness and justice with conditions enabling citizens to realize 
their fundamental interests. A political conception is realistically Utopian when it 
"extends what are ordinarily thought to be the limits of practicable political possibility 
and, in doing so, reconciles us to our political and social condition".6 
For Rawls the ideal case allows for a particular type of clarity in reasoning, where 
the salient features that should be embodied when defining principles of justice are best 
revealed. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls explains that ideal theory, or strict compliance 
theory, deals with cases in which all agents fully comply with the principles of justice 
that would regulate a well-ordered society. Conversely, there are two types of non-ideal 
theory, one that applies to cases of partial compliance and the other to instances of 
unfavourable and/or burdensome conditions. Non-ideal theory is concerned with "the 
principles that govern how we are to deal with injustice".7 Rawls insists that ideal theory 
provides "the only basis for the systematic grasp of these more pressing problems".8 Ideal 
theory, as he iterates in Political Liberalism, "is a necessary complement to non-ideal 
theory without which the desire for change lacks aim".9 
The Law of Peoples is formulated to apply to ideal conditions among well-
ordered liberal societies or those that are reasonably decent and well-ordered.10 The Law 
of Peoples is not designed to address the vast number of issues and difficulties 
encountered in our contemporary world, but rather aims to establish principles of foreign 
policy as part of political liberalism that both liberal and decent societies could 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 11. For a fuller explanation on what Rawls conceives as a 'realistic 
Utopia' see The Lav.' of Peoples part 1: 11-23. 
7
 Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice, 8. 
Rawls, John. A Theory: of Justice, 8. 
9
 Rawls, John. Political Liberalism, 285. 
10
 Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 17. 
7 
reasonably agree to endorse.11 Within Rawls's realistic Utopia, the society of peoples is 
composed of reasonable and rational members who generally accept the governing 
principles of justice and fair terms of cooperation. Members generally adhere to public 
reasoning about justice and aim to endorse what Rawls identifies as a conception of the 
common good in their discourse. As Samuel Freeman asserts: "The Law of Peoples, then, 
is designed to apply in the first instance to hypothetical conditions, among well-ordered 
liberal and decent societies each of which has concern for the well-being of its own 
people and seeks their common good, and respects others as free and equal peoples".12 
The Two Original Positions 
Rawls utilizes a two-step thought experiment - the original position - to develop 
his ideal theory of justice. The first step of the original position is to determine the fair 
conditions from which the parties of the contractual agreement are to decide upon their 
political conception. The second step is to stipulate, based on these conditions, what 
principles of justice and fair cooperation would be adopted by the contractual parties. 
Additionally, Rawls has two original positions: 1) for the domestic case and 2) for the 
international case. The original position reveals a type of constructivist methodological 
approach to the derivation of the terms of justice as fairness for Rawls.13 It is regarded by 
Rawls as the appropriate initial situation for social contract.14 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 9-10. 
Freeman, Samuel. "The Law of Peoples, Social Cooperation, Human Rights, and Distributive Justice", 
32. 
"A constructivist conception of justice represents the principles of justice not as part of some timeless 
and mind-independent moral order known through theoretical reason, but rather as "the outcome of a 
procedure of construction" rooted in practical rather than theoretical reasoning". Rex Martin and David. 
A Reidy, Rawls's Law of Peoples, 11. 
Rawls asserts that the original position is the appropriate instrument for specifying the fair terms of 
social cooperation, given his initial assumption that reasonable pluralism is an inherent characteristic of 
well-ordered liberal democracies. Reasonable pluralism, according to Rawls's terminology, identifies 
8 
The first use of the original position appears in Rawls's earlier work and is used to 
identify the principles of justice as fairness for the domestic case.I5The subject matter of 
the first use of the original position is the basic structure of society. It is in this instance 
where free and equal moral citizens are represented as the contracting parties within the 
society in question. Rawls insists that contractual parties participating in adopting a 
political conception of justice to govern their interactions within a liberal society must 
choose the principles of justice from behind "a thick veil of ignorance".16Behind the veil 
of ignorance, contracting parties are stripped of any knowledge of their own social 
position and circumstance. Rawls asserts that: "among the essential features of this 
situation is that no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor 
does any one know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his 
intelligence, strength, and the like".I7Rawls insists that the principles of justice are 
chosen behind a veil of ignorance to ensure "that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged 
in the choice of principles by the outcome of natural chance or the contingency of social 
circumstances."18 By ensuring that principles are decided so as not to favour any 
"the fact of profound and irreconcilable differences in citizens' reasonable comprehensive religious and 
philosophical conceptions of the world, and in their views of the moral and aesthetic values to be sought 
in human life"( Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, 3-4). Reasonable pluralism characterizes a society 
with free institutions and limits what is practically possible in terms of political philosophy. The original 
position orientates free and equal citizens fairly, where a point of view of fair agreement can be reached 
by terms of political justice. The thick veil of ignorance that the original position requires conceals 
traditional bargaining advantages and particular features of circumstance, thus establishing a point of 
view from which fair agreement between free and equal citizens can be reached. For a fuller 
explanation see John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, 3-4. 
See the discussion of the original position and the veil of ignorance in Political Liberalism, 1: §4. and A 
Theory of Justice. 111. 
The 'veil of ignorance' is considered 'thick' according to Rawls, because contracting parties have no 
prior knowledge of the comprehensive doctrines they uphold. For a fuller explanation please refer to 
Rawls, John. Political Liberalism, 24 n.27. 
17
 Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice, 11. 
18 " 
Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice, 11. 
9 
particular condition or circumstance the resulting principles of justice have been 
constructed from a method of fair agreement. 
The original position is setup to abstract away bargaining advantages and to 
provide the necessary conditions for fair agreement between free and equal persons. 
According to Rawls: "the original position is simply a device of representation: it 
describes the parties, each of whom is responsible for the essential interests of free and 
equal citizens, as fairly situated and as reaching an agreement subject to conditions that 
appropriately limit what they can put forward as good reasons".19From this we can see 
that for Rawls the original position in the domestic case models two things: 
First, it models what we regard - here and now - as fair conditions under 
which the representatives of citizens, viewed solely as free and equal 
persons, are to agree to the fair terms of cooperation whereby the basic 
structure is to be regulated. Second, it models what we regard - here and 
now - as acceptable restrictions on the reasons on the basis of which the 
parties, situated in fair conditions, may properly put forward certain 
principles of political justice and reject others.20 
The original position provides the instance of fair agreement where the principles that 
will underlie the basic structure of society can be justly reached. 
Given the first use of the original position Rawls derives two basic principles of 
justice that those who were subject to its use could reasonably agree to endorse. These 
two principles of domestic justice are: 
a) Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate 
scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the 
same scheme of liberties for all; and 
19
 Rawls, John. Political Liberalism, 25. Especially refer to fn:28, where Rawls asserts that the original 
position models a basic feature of both Kant's moral constructivism and of political constructivism. 
Here there is a brief discussion on the distinction between reasonable and rational as Rawls conceives it. 
Rawls, John. Justice as Fairness, 17. 
10 
b) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, 
they are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under 
conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to 
the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society (the 
difference principle).21 
According to Rawls, the first principle is designed to cover constitutional 
essentials (written or unwritten) and the second principle identifies the need for fair 
equality of opportunity and asserts that social and economic inequalities will be governed 
by 'the difference principle'. The first principle takes priority over the second. 
Additionally, "the difference principle is subordinate to both the first principle of justice 
(guaranteeing the equal basic liberties) and the principle of fair equality of opportunity."22 
Rawls argues that basic rights and liberties are to take priority and that it is impermissible 
to trade off or exchange rights or liberties captured by the first principle for the economic 
advantages that the difference principle may allow for. However, the two principles of 
justice are designed to operate in tandem and apply as a complement to one another. 
A great deal of criticism, as we will come to see in the following chapter, has 
arisen in response to Rawls's defence of a principle of distributive justice in his domestic 
theory and his resistance to endorse such a principle in the global context. I would like to 
narrow our focus at this point and look closer at the difference principle and what it 
entails, according to Rawls. The difference principle stipulates that the only inequalities 
that are permissible are those that seek to benefit the least advantaged. Rawls claims that 
the difference principle is a principle of reciprocity in that: "the existing inequalities are 
Rawls, John. Justice as Fairness, 42-43. 
Rawls, John. Justice as Fairness, 61. For a fuller explanation also refer to § 13.1 in Justice as Fairness. 
11 
to fulfill the condition of benefiting others as well as ourselves". To clarify, in A Theory 
of Justice Rawls argues for a principle of distributive justice, the difference principle, that 
is to be applied within different societies domestically, but not among them.24 Here 
inequalities are permitted on the condition that there is fair equality of opportunity and 
that each society fulfils a duty to structure its economic and legal institutions in such a 
way that the worst-off persons benefit most under this arrangement, in spite of 
inequalities, compared to alternative social arrangements. Rawls sets up the difference 
principle to benefit the least advantaged within a given closed society; however, each 
society does not have a duty to structure its system to maximize the position of the least 
advantaged on a global scale.25 
Now that the first use of the original position has been outlined it is time to turn 
our attention toward the second use of the original position, which occurs in the 
international instance. For the purposes of this work much of the focus of critique and 
analysis will apply to the international use of the original position. However, it is still 
useful to understand the domestic use of the original position so as to recognize and 
Rawls, John. Justice as Fairness, 64. This notion of reciprocity is quite essential to both Rawls's theory 
of domestic and global justice. It stems from Rawls's conception of what is required to attain fair terms 
of social cooperation. For Rawls the fair terms of cooperation specify an idea of reciprocity where: "our 
exercise of political power is proper only when we sincerely believe that the reasons we offer for our 
political action may reasonably be accepted by other citizens as a justification for those actions" (Rawls, 
Political Liberalism, xliv). Additionally Rawls asserts that: "reciprocity is a relation between citizens 
expressed by principles of justice that regulate a social world in which all who are engaged in 
cooperation and do their part as the rules and procedures require are to benefit in an appropriate way as 
assessed by a suitable benchmark of comparison" (Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 49nl4.) For a fuller 
account of Rawls's idea of reciprocity, see Political Liberalism, pp. 16-17 and "The Idea of Public 
Reason Revisited", reprinted in The Law of Peoples. 
For additional information on John Rawls's difference principle, refer to A Theory of Justice, § 13:65-73, 
Political Liberalism, 282-283, and Justice as Fairness, 42-43, 59-60, especially §18:61-66. 
In the domestic case where the original position is used in the works A Theory of Justice, Political 
Liberalism, and Justice as Fairness, Rawls simply assumes that we are addressing closed societies. In 
The Law of Peoples, this position is argued for. 
12 
compare the principles brought forward from the first use (domestic) to that of the second 
(international). 
The second original position is used to extend a liberal conception to the Law of 
Peoples. Similar to the first use of the original position, the international original position 
is used as a model of representation. However, there are two main differences between 
the first and second use: 1) the first use of the original position concerns the basic 
structure of society, whereas in the second use of the original position, parties are 
concerned with establishing principles that govern relations between peoples, 2) The 
parties in the first use of the original position are representatives of individual citizens 
who are part of the liberal society in question, whereas in the second use of the original 
position, the parties are representatives of liberal or decent peoples . There are two steps 
to the second use of the original position: the symmetrical positioning of both liberal 
democratic peoples and reasonably decent hierarchical peoples. Rawls considers the Law 
of Peoples from each perspective. He does so for two main reasons. Beitz explains that, 
firstly liberal and decent peoples have different fundamental interests, which have 
relevance when deciding the principles of foreign policy. Given the different political 
cultures exhibited by both liberal and decent peoples, each type of people will typically 
express an interest in securing international conditions in which their culture and 
institutions can be sustained and flourish.26 Rawls's second reason for considering the 
Law of Peoples from a nonliberal perspective, explains Beitz, is a reflection of the 
requirement of reciprocity that Rawls believes is intrinsic to liberalism itself: we wish to 
act on principles which are not only reasonable to us but which we believe it would be 
Beitz, Charles. "Rawls's Law of Peoples", 675. 
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reasonable to expect those affected by our actions to also accept. For now we will focus 
on the positioning of liberal peoples before moving on to the considerations of non-
liberal parties. 
It is important to understand why Rawls chooses peoples as opposed to states as 
the appropriate contractual parties in the international case. Rawls uses the language of 
'peoples' because, whereas states are rational, anxiously concerned with power, and 
guided by their basic interests, peoples are reasonable and additionally concerned with 
insuring reasonable justice for all of their citizens as well as for all other peoples.28 More 
specifically, the use of the terms peoples, according to Rawls, enables us to attribute 
moral motives to the contracting parties in the second use of the original position, much 
the same as the reciprocal moral character of individual citizens in the first use of the 
original position.29 For example, the use of the language of peoples makes possible the 
allegiance to the principles of the Law of Peoples and permits wars only as a means of 
self-defence. Rawls specifies that "the term 'peoples', then, is meant to emphasize these 
singular features of peoples as distinct from states as traditionally conceived, and to 
highlight their moral character and the reasonably just, or decent, nature of their 
regimes".30 
The fundamental interests of peoples in comparison to states is yet another 
important distinction Rawls makes. A state's basic interests, according to Rawls, can be 
typically described as the struggles for power, prestige, wealth, security, territory, and 
See Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 58 and Beitz, Charles. "Rawls's Law of Peoples", 675. 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 28. 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 17. 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 27. 
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such.31 Conversely, peoples participating in the Society of Peoples will regard themselves 
as free and equal. Rawls says, that liberal peoples are concerned with striving to protect 
their political independence, free culture with its civil liberties, maintain security, 
territory, and the well-being of its citizens. In addition to this, Rawls insists that what 
distinguishes peoples from states "is that just peoples are fully prepared to grant the very 
same proper respect and recognition to other peoples as equals".32 This notion of equal 
respect compliments Rawls's notion of reciprocity (previously mentioned) that is deeply 
entrenched within his theory of both domestic and international justice. Rawls asserts that 
the rationality and reasonableness that peoples exhibit enables them to offer to other 
peoples fair terms of political and social cooperation. The fair terms offered are those that 
a people sincerely believe other equal peoples would reasonably agree to. Additionally, 
out of mutual respect and recognition of equality, peoples will seek to honour the 
proposed terms of agreement even if it would be advantageous for a particular people to 
violate those terms. It is from this that we can see Rawls's notion of reciprocity applying 
similarly to the Law of Peoples as it operates within a just liberal domestic constitutional 
regime. Thus, peoples can be distinguished from states given their moral nature, their 
ability to attribute equal status and respect to other peoples, and their commitment to seek 
ongoing cooperation for the right reasons between peoples over time.33 It is important to 
understand this part of Rawls's theory as I will go on to argue that Rawls's notion of 
reciprocity entrenched within his ideal theory combined with his conception of what a 
people embodies offers a strong safeguard against the realist type worries of 
Rawls, Rawls. The Law of Peoples, 28-29. 
Rawls, Rawls. The Law of Peoples, 35. 
For more on this please refer to John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, §2:25-30, 34-35. 
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manipulation, corruption, and coercion that have been so often present in our 
contemporary international system. This will further contribute to our analysis of the 
sufficiency and robustness of the duty of assistance, given the objections raised by 
Rawls's cosmopolitan critics who argue that the duty does not demand enough given the 
levels of oppression and exploitation that are experienced on a global scale. 
Despite differences in subject matter and parties represented, both the first and 
second uses of the original position share several common features. Both model the 
parties as (1) representing citizens/peoples fairly and equally; (2) instrumentally rational; 
(3) selecting from available principles of justice those that apply to the appropriate 
subject (either the basic structure of society, or relations between peoples); (4) making 
these decisions for appropriate reasons; and (5) selecting for reasons related to the 
fundamental interests of citizens/peoples as reasonable and rational.34 
The fourth feature mentioned above is secured by the condition that the parties to 
both uses of the original position are under a thick veil of ignorance. As mentioned earlier 
this means that they are ignorant of any knowledge that would cause them to be biased in 
their selection of principles, thereby guaranteeing that principles are not selected for self-
serving purposes that could be detrimental to the well-being of others. Similar to the 
domestic case where the parties do not know such things as their economic status, 
religion, race, or gender, parties to the second use of the original position are ignorant of, 
for example, the size of their territory, their population, their level of economic 
development, and their natural resources. Just as in the domestic case Rawls insists that 
this "thick" veil of ignorance is necessary in the international case to insure fairness given 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 31. 
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the fact of reasonable pluralism. However, there is one fact that may not be concealed by 
the veil of ignorance in the international case: "they do know that reasonable favourable 
conditions obtain that make constitutional democracy possible - since they know they 
represent liberal societies".35 This fact escapes concealment because the second use of the 
original position is applied on two levels, first for liberal peoples and in the second 
instance for decent peoples. 
By employing the international original position, Rawls derives eight principles of 
justice that can be reasonably agreed upon between free, equal, independent and well-
ordered peoples. The principles of the Law of Peoples are: 
1) Peoples are free and independent and their freedom and independence 
are to be respected by other peoples; 
2) Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings; 
3) Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them; 
4) Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention; 
5) Peoples have the right to self-defence but no right to instigate war for 
reasons other than self-defence; 
6) Peoples are to honor human rights; 
7) Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions for the conduct of 
war; 
8) Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavourable 
conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social 
regime.36 
For Rawls these principles constitute the basic charter of the Law of Peoples. The final 
principle, Rawls's duty of assistance, will be our main concern throughout this work. 
35
 Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 33. 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 37. 
17 
However, before we can begin to discuss what the duty of assistance entails and evaluate 
its sufficiency and robustness, there are still a few theoretical aspects that we should 
come to understand. Here, I am predominantly concerned with the ideal conditions that 
Rawls builds into his account of the Society of Peoples and its members. Who qualifies 
as justified members in Rawls's Society of Peoples will have significant implications in 
our determination of the robustness and sufficiency of the duty of assistance, and, 
moreover, contributes even further to Rawls's goal of producing a theory of global justice 
that can be considered a realistic Utopia. The next section will discuss who is to be 
permitted into the Society of Peoples, according to Rawls, and his justifications required 
for the permissibility of such membership. 
The Features of Well-Ordered Liberal Democratic People 
As noted above, Rawls derives his ideal conditions and principles from what can 
be reasonably agreed upon between well-ordered liberal and decent societies. In The Law 
of Peoples, Rawls conceives liberal democratic and decent peoples as the actors in the 
Society of Peoples, similarly to how citizens are the actors in domestic society.37 
To better understand Rawls's framework one must identify what is meant by 
"well-ordered" liberal and decent societies. Rawls distinguishes a well-ordered liberal 
society as one composed of and exhibiting three basic features: 1. The Institutional 
Feature - where a reasonably just constitutional democratic government serves the 
fundamental interests of the given society, 2. The Cultural Feature - where citizens are 
united by what Mill calls "common sympathies" and 3. The Moral Feature - where moral 
and political attachment to right and justice are derived from a common conception of 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 23. 
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right and justice.38 Rawls specifies that a reasonably just, though not necessarily fully 
just, constitutional democratic government, is one where "the government is effectively 
under their political and electoral control, and that it answers to and protects their 
fundamental interests as specified in a written or unwritten constitution and in its 
interpretation".39 Rawls notes that such a regime would operate as a cooperative 
collective public and not as, he points out, "an autonomous agency pursuing its own 
bureaucratic ambitions".40 Moreover, Rawls asserts that such a regime would "not [be] 
directed by the interests of large concentrations of private economic and corporate power 
veiled from public knowledge and almost entirely free from accountability".41 Although 
Rawls avoids offering any detailed and sustaining suggestions as to what institutions and 
practises might be necessary to ensure the reasonably just character of a constitutional 
government, he does provide a footnoted example of the importance of public financing 
of both elections and forums for public discussion.42 
For a liberal people to be united by common sympathies and a desire to be under 
the same democratic government, Rawls asserts, it is not necessary to have those 
sympathies be entirely dependent upon a common language, history, and political culture; 
such dependence may in fact be entirely unattainable. Rather, Rawls takes the idea of 
common sympathies to express a shared desire for a common conception of justice as 
fairness. 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 23-25. 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 24. 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 24. 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 24. 
See Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples. 23 n.l 9. 
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For Rawls, liberal peoples have a certain moral character. Similarly to citizens in 
a domestic society, liberal peoples are to be both reasonable and rational.43 The technical 
term 'reasonable', for Rawls, is used in a more restricted sense contrary to traditional 
conceptions such as those constructed by Kant. Rather, Rawls associates it "first, with the 
willingness to propose and honor fair terms of cooperation, and second, with the 
willingness to recognize the burdens of judgment and to accept their consequences".44 He 
claims that persons are reasonable in one basic aspect: when among equals they are ready 
to propose principles and standards as fair terms of cooperation, abide by them willingly, 
given that others will do likewise. Reasonable persons are not motivated by the general 
good, but desire for its own sake a social world in which free and equal citizens can 
cooperate with others on terms all can accept. The term 'rational', as used by Rawls, is a 
distinct idea from reasonable. The rational "applies to a single, unified agent (either an 
individual or corporate person) with the powers of judgment and deliberation in seeking 
ends and interests peculiarly its own".45 
Rawls claims that within the idea of fair terms of cooperation the reasonable and 
rational are complementary ideas. He explains that "they work in tandem to specify the 
idea of fair terms of cooperation, taking into account the kind of social cooperation in 
question, the nature of the parties and their standing with respect to one another".46 
Rational conduct in regards to the Law of Peoples is organized and expressed through 
public elections and voting, and is representative of the laws and policies of their 
For a full discussion on Rawls's use of the terms reasonable and rational see A Theory of Justice, 123-
130, 277-278, 309-310 and Political Liberalism, 48-54. 
Rawls, John. Political Liberalism, 49. 
Rawls, John. Political Liberalism, 50. 
Rawls, John. Political Liberalism, 52. 
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government. Additionally, notes Rawls, rational conduct is constrained by their sense of 
what is reasonable. Reasonable peoples show proper respect for and offer fair terms of 
cooperation to other peoples. They are mutually disinterested and seek to establish fair 
terms that a people sincerely believe other equal peoples might also accept. Reasonable 
peoples honor these terms proposed even if it would be to their advantage to violate 
them.47 
We can see, that the entrenched notions so important to Rawls's system of liberal 
political theory - the social contract, ideas of public reason, overlapping consensus, and 
reasonable pluralism - are always operating in the background. Analogous to how 
citizens in Rawls's domestic society offer reasonable and fair terms of cooperation that 
can be accepted by other citizens, liberal or decent peoples, in Rawls's Society of 
Peoples, also offer fair and acceptable terms of cooperation to other peoples. In this 
instance both participating parties are mutually advantaged, and according to Rawls "a 
people will honour these terms when assured that other peoples will do so as well."48 
Once again, these fair terms of agreement are established by use of the original position 
and are maintained by peoples' displaying what Rawls refers to as reciprocity and mutual 
respect. From this it becomes clear that stability and peace are maintained for the right 
reasons and not just as a modus vivendi in Rawls's account.49 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 35. 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 25. 
See Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 44-45and Political Liberalism, 458-459. A modus vivendi occurs 
when stability is achieved by a balance of forces. It is a Latin phrase where: a) modus means mode, way 
and b) vivendi is a means of living. It implies an accommodation between disputing parties where life 
continues in respect of the differences at hand. Typically this terms signifies a political stalemate or a 
truce. The Cold War is perhaps an appropriate example (if we ignore the wars fought by proxy in the 
Balkans) of a modus vivendi where the arms race created a political stalemate between Russia and the 
USA. Here stability was achieved to a certain extent by the balance of force for fear of nuclear threat 
and nuclear warfare. On Rawls's account "stability for the right reasons describes a situation in which, 
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It is important to understand that the motivations for entering into Rawls's social 
contract on both the domestic and international sphere are very different from that 
formulated by Hobbes and other contractarians. For instance, Hobbes' parties enter into 
the social contract out of insecurity, fear, and a strong desire to escape the ills of the state 
of nature that are comparable to a state of war.50 Here, parties to the social contract seek 
to obtain preservation and security by the mutual surrendering of unbridled liberty to an 
absolute sovereign. Conversely, for Rawls, parties submit to the original position out of a 
mutual understanding and mutual respect for reasonable pluralism and overlapping 
consensus51 that is pervasive to liberal societies who uphold free institutions, values of 
freedom of conscience and association, and the like.52 
Decent Peoples and Toleration 
At a first glance it may seem somewhat unusual that Rawls chooses to include 
decent hierarchical well-ordered peoples as acting members given that the Law of 
Peoples is developed from within political liberalism and is an extension of a liberal 
over the course of time, citizens acquire a sense of justice that inclines them not only to accept but to act 
upon the principles of justice" (The Law of Peoples, 45). Stability for the right reasons rests in part, 
explains Rawls, on an allegiance to the Law of Peoples itself. 
Hobbes, Thomas (1668). Leviathan, ed. 1994 (Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., Indianapolis, 
Indiana). See chapters xiv-xix:79-127. 
For a full account of overlapping consensus see Rawls, John. Political Liberalism §4: 132-138. In brief, 
given the fact of reasonable pluralism, which conveys the idea that citizens will hold different 
comprehensive views- religious, philosophical, moral - these individuals will affirm the political 
conception of their society for different reasons. However, these differences do not, explains Rawls, 
prevent the political conception from being a shared view (an overlapping consensus) from which 
citizens can resolve questions about the constitutional essentials. He claims that "the idea of 
overlapping consensus is introduced to make the idea of a well-ordered society more realistic and to 
adjust it to the historical and social conditions of democratic societies, which included the fact of 
reasonable pluralism" (Political Liberalism, 32). The technical term overlapping consensus refers to 
how citizens, who uphold different comprehensive doctrines, can come to reasonably agree on the terms 
for fair political organization and the arrangements for creating and sustaining just institutions of their 
society. 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 14-16. 
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conception of domestic justice to a Society of Peoples. However, Rawls offers the 
following explanation for such inclusion within the Society of Peoples: "The reason for 
going on to consider the point of view of decent hierarchical peoples is not to prescribe 
principles of justice for them, but to assure ourselves that nonliberal principles of foreign 
policy are also reasonable from a decent nonliberal point of view".53 Rawls maintains that 
the motivation to obtain this assurance is intrinsic to the liberal conception. It would be 
self-defeating for a liberal people to impose their conceived liberal values upon another 
people given the facts of reasonable pluralism, a sense of public reason, and the 
employment of overlapping consensus that Rawls distinguishes as the foundation of just 
liberal democracies. Liberalism for Rawls, as we have discussed, embodies a mutual 
respect for a plurality of differing, but reasonable views; on the international scale for 
Rawls to remain truly liberal he must come to respect and tolerate a plurality of 
reasonably well-ordered peoples, such as decent hierarchal peoples as we shall see. 
Before we can come to understand Rawls's reasoning for offering terms of 
toleration and inclusion to decent peoples, perhaps it would be useful to explore more 
fully the essential features of a decent people according to Rawls. The term 'decency', for 
Rawls, expresses a normative idea closely related to that of reasonableness. However, 
decency is a much weaker idea, in that it does not encompass the same considerations or 
accommodations that reasonableness accounts for. Recall that reasonable citizens in a 
liberal society, Rawls explains, "are characterized by their willingness to offer fair terms 
of social cooperation among equals and by their recognition of the burdens of 
Rawls John. The Law of Peoples, 58. 
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judgment".4 Decency on the other hand covers instances where individuals belong to an 
associationist social form, which first regards persons as members of groups -
associations, corporations and estates. A society is distinctly decent in that it has a 
common good idea of justice that ensures human rights for all citizens; however groups 
are to be decently represented in the hierarchical consultation by elected bodies rather 
than equally situated individuals. Decency much like reasonableness, Rawls claims, is 
normative in that meaning is assigned by the use of the term.55 The account of decency, 
similarly to that of reasonableness, is developed explains Rawls, by setting out various 
criteria and metrics to explain the meaning. Soon to be explained, Rawls offers two 
criteria that must be met if a people are to be considered decent and worthy of toleration 
and inclusion in the Society of Peoples. 
It is important to note that Rawls describes in depth what he calls a "decent 
consultation hierarchy"; however, he recognizes that other types of decent peoples may 
exist with different basic structures of organization that do not fit the description offered. 
Rawls defines a decent consultation hierarchy as being organized in such as way where 
the basic structure of the society "must include a family of representative bodies whose 
role in the hierarchy is to take part in an established procedure of consultation and to look 
after what the people's common good idea of justice regards as the important interests of 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 87. 
For a more in depth explanation of this see John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 86-88. Here Rawls 
expresses that despite the Law of Peoples being indebted to Kant's idea of the foedus pacificum and 
much of his thought, at no point does Rawls attempt to deduce the principles of right and justice, or 
decency, or the principles of rationality, from a conception of practical reason, in the same manner as 
Kant. Rather he admits to giving content to an idea of practical reason and its three component parts, the 
ideas of reasonableness, decency, and rationality. For Rawls, there is no list of necessary and sufficient 
conditions for each of these ideas, and differences of opinion are to be expected. He conjectures "that if 
the content of reasonableness, decency, and rationality is laid out properly, the resulting principles and 
standards of right and justice will hang together and will be affirmed by us on due reflection" (p.87). 
24 
all members of the people".56 Given this, Rawls expresses that these types of societies 
may assume many institutional forms, religious and secular. However, all of these 
societies are associationist in form: "that is, the members of these societies are viewed in 
public life as members of different groups, and each group is represented in the legal 
system by a body in a decent consultation hierarchy."57 These individuals in a decent 
consultation hierarchical arrangement are not regarded as free and equal citizens, nor 
separate individuals deserving equal representation (according to the maxim: one citizen 
one vote); however, they are to be regarded as decent, rational, and responsible members 
of the society who act in accordance with the people's common good idea of justice58. 
This notion of acting with respect to the common good idea of justice relays that 
individuals in such a society and those representing them will aim at maintaining 
conditions and achieving objectives that are similarly in everyone's advantage. The 
common good according to Rawls expresses "certain general conditions that are in an 
appropriate sense equally to everyone's advantage".59 
Rawls establishes two main criteria that must be met so that a people may be 
considered a decent hierarchical people.60 The first criterion to be met is that the people in 
question must express neither aggressive nor expansionist aims. A decent people must 
engage in peaceful diplomacy and respect the social order of other peoples, despite being 
guided by some sort of comprehensive doctrine (religious or otherwise). Decent peoples 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 71. For a fuller explanation see The Law of Peoples, §9: 71-78 
Rawls, John. 77;e Law of Peoples, 64. 
For a fuller account of what a common good conception of justice capture see Rawls, John. The Law of 
Peoples, §9.1:71-72. 
Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice, 217. 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, §8.2: 64-67. 
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conduct themselves peacefully, cooperatively, and adhere to the ideal of reciprocal 
respect previously discussed. 
The second criterion that Rawls distinguishes has three parts. Firstly, a decent 
hierarchal people's system of law, in conjunction with its common good conception of 
justice, secures human rights for all members of the people in question. Rawls identifies 
that a decent people will ensure that the right to life, to liberty, to personal property, and 
to formal equality as expressed by the rules of natural justice be upheld.61 Second, a 
decent people's system of law must be such as to impose sincere moral duties and 
obligations on all individuals living within the given society. Rawls notes that these 
duties and obligations are distinct from human rights. Additionally, these duties and 
obligations fit in with the society's common good idea of justice, and are not viewed as 
mere commands imposed by force. This is achievable, according to Rawls, because the 
members of a people are viewed as rational and responsible and able to play a part and 
have input in the social life of their society. Third, there must be a sincere and not 
unreasonable belief on the part of judges and other officials who administer the legal 
system that the law is indeed guided by a common idea of justice. In summation: 
Thus, a decent people must honor the laws of peace; its system of law 
must be such as to respect human rights and to impose duties and 
obligations on all persons in its territory. Its system of law must follow a 
common good idea of justice that takes into account what it sees as the 
fundamental interests of everyone in society. And, finally, there must be a^  
sincere and not unreasonable belief on the part of judges and other 
officials that the law is indeed guided by a common good idea of justice.62 
A more detailed discussion of human rights and basic needs will be provided in chapter 3 of this work. 
Additionally, for a fuller description of the human rights that a decent people are expected to uphold see 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, p.65. 
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Now that I have provided what is hoped to be a satisfactory account of what 
Rawls describes as decent peoples the case must be made as to why such a people would 
agree to be included in the Society of Peoples and chose to adopt the eight principles 
previously argued for by Rawls and adopted by liberal societies. Rawls argues that given 
that decent hierarchal peoples are well-ordered and meet the two previously established 
criteria, he submits that their representatives in an appropriate original position would 
adopt the same eight principles that liberal peoples have come to agree to. Rawls' 
argument proceeds as follows: 
Decent hierarchal peoples do not engage in aggressive war; therefore their 
representatives respect the civic order and integrity of other peoples and 
accept the symmetrical situation (the equality) of the original position as 
fair. Next, in view of the common good ideas of justice held in decent 
hierarchical societies, the representatives strive both to protect human 
rights and the good of the people they represent and to maintain their 
security and independence. The representatives care about the benefits of 
trade and also accept the idea of assistance among peoples in times of 
need. Hence, we can say that the representatives of hierarchical societies 
are decent and rational. In view of this reasoning, we can also say that the 
members of decent hierarchical societies would accept - as you and I 
would accept - the original position as fair among peoples, and would 
endorse the Law of Peoples adopted by their representatives as specifying 
fair terms of political cooperation with other peoples.63 
As argued for by Rawls decent hierarchal peoples are governed by a common good 
conception of justice, that is they seek to build and sustain the conditions and institutions 
that are to the advantage of each group represented by the consultation and by each 
member of the society. Additionally, decent societies respect human rights and basic 
needs for their own sake. Respect for human rights in a decent society is further fostered 
by the society's commitment to be ruled by law and not by force. They too, seek stability 
for the rights reasons and do not express expansionist aims. Given this desire, stability for 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 69. 
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the rights reasons, decent peoples can accept the terms of fair political cooperation 
established by the Law of Peoples as it is not particularly liberal in form. 
A central and somewhat contentious notion in The Law of Peoples that Rawls 
discusses is the liberal idea of toleration. Rawls claims, "a main task in extending the 
Law of Peoples to nonliberal peoples is to specify how far liberal peoples are to tolerate 
non-liberal peoples".64For Rawls toleration has two main requirements. Firstly, there is 
the common use of the term, where toleration requires liberal societies to refrain from 
exercising political sanctions - military, economic, or diplomatic - to pressure a people 
toward becoming liberal. Second, and perhaps more importantly, to be a tolerant liberal 
society participating in the Society of Peoples means to "recognize these nonliberal 
societies as equal participating members in good standing of the Society of Peoples, with 
certain rights and obligations, including the duty of civility requiring that they offer other 
peoples public reasons appropriate to the Society of Peoples for their actions".65 
Again the idea of reasonable pluralism that Rawls finds essential to the 
maintenance of a reasonably just liberal society pushes him to assert that liberal societies 
are to cooperate with and assist decent peoples. Rawls argues that: "if all societies were 
required to be liberal, then the idea of political liberalism would fail to express due 
toleration for other acceptable ways (if such there are, as I assume) of ordering society".66 
It would be self-defeating and self-contradictory for liberalism to demand otherwise 
given the liberal commitment of respect for reasonable and competing comprehensive 
views. In his domestic theory of justice Rawls argues that a liberal society is "to respect 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 59. 
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its citizens' comprehensive doctrines - religious, philosophical, and moral - provided that 
these doctrines are pursued in ways compatible with a reasonable political conception of 
justice and its public reason".67 Taking this further, Rawls goes on to claim that: 
"provided a nonliberal society's basic institutions meet certain specified conditions of 
political right and justice and lead its people to honor a reasonable and just law for the 
Society of Peoples, a liberal people is to tolerate and accept that society".68 Rawls 
identifies those societies that satisfy these conditions as decent peoples. 
An additional consideration that Rawls proposes is that the inclusion of decent 
peoples will further foster the liberal values of mutual respect and will preserve room for 
political self-determination by a people. Rawls argues that: "if liberal peoples require all 
societies to be liberal and subject those that are not to politically enforced sanctions, the 
decent nonliberal peoples - if there are such - will be denied a due measure of respect by 
liberal peoples".69 This lack of respect, Rawls purports, has the potential to injure the self-
respect of decent nonliberal peoples as peoples, and their individual citizens. Such 
disrespect amongst peoples could further lead to great bitterness and resentment; 
consequently shaming, intolerance, and the denial of respect will require strong 
justifications. Given that decent peoples cannot be said to deny human rights and even 
afford their citizens many participatory political rights, this for Rawls, provides 
insufficient reasons for intolerance and disrespect. It follows then that because decent 
peoples allow a right of dissent and are able to accomplish political reform by their own 
means, tolerance and inclusion of decent peoples in the Society of Peoples preserves 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples. 59. 
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significant room for the idea of a people's self-determination. This idea further 
contributes, as previously mentioned, to stability in the Society of Peoples as being 
established and maintained for the right reasons. 
The Duty of Assistance 
In Part III of the Law of Peoples, Rawls seeks to address the instances of non-
ideal theory. To accomplish his aims of providing an account of global justice theory that 
will guide how liberal peoples are to interact with other types of peoples on the 
international stage, it is important for Rawls to consider, in addition to decent hierarchical 
peoples, the treatment of both "outlaw states" and "burdened peoples". Beginning with 
the initial assumption that there is the possibility of some well-ordered peoples existing in 
the world, who fundamentally express a shared desire to live in a world in which all 
peoples follow and accept the (ideal of the) Law of Peoples, it is essential for Rawls to 
provide a plan of action that will enable well-ordered peoples to attain this common goal. 
Recognizing that there exists both well-ordered peoples and peoples living under, as 
Rawls puts it, highly non-ideal conditions, struggling "with great injustices and social 
evils", Rawls's non-ideal theory looks for "policies and courses of action that are morally 
permissible and politically possible as well as likely to be effective" in order to transform 
a world containing non-well-ordered peoples to a world in which all societies come to 
accept and follow the Law of Peoples.71 
There are two kinds of non-ideal theory: one deals with conditions of 
noncompliance, and the other with unfavourable conditions. In the former conditions, 
For a fuller explanation of this argument see John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 60-62. 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 89. Emphasis added. 
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some regimes refuse to comply with the Law of Peoples and engage in war in the hope of 
advancing their rational interests. Rawls calls these regimes "outlaw states". The latter 
refers to the conditions of those societies "whose historical, social, and economic 
circumstances make their achieving a well-ordered regime ... difficult if not 
impossible".72 These societies are called "burdened societies". For the purposes of this 
work we will put aside the consideration of outlaw states, however important, and focus 
solely on what Rawls has termed burdened societies in our evaluation of the sufficiency 
and robustness of the duty of assistance. 
A burdened society, for Rawls, reflects the unfavourable conditions detrimentally 
impacting a given society that prevent it from becoming well-ordered. These conditions 
include, but may not be limited to historical, social, and economic circumstances.73 
Burdened societies are "not expansive or aggressive, [but rather] lack the political and 
cultural traditions, the human capital and know-how, and often the material and 
technological resources needed to be well-ordered".74 As we have already established, 
well-ordered peoples have a duty to assist burdened societies toward the goal of 
becoming well-ordered. Rawls specifies three guidelines for the duty of assistance: 1) 
The recognition that a well-ordered society need not be a wealthy society; 2) The 
acknowledgement that the political culture of a society is all-important and that there is 
no particular recipe for changing the social order and political culture of a society; and 3) 
The definition of both a target and cutoff of assistance; which require aid up to a point 
where the once burdened society is positioned in such a way so as to be able to meet the 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 90. 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 90. 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 106. 
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basic needs of its citizens, reasonably and rationally manage their own affairs, and 
eventually become a member of the Society of well-ordered Peoples.75 From here, we 
will move on to expand upon the implications that each guideline of the duty of 
assistance demands. Doing so will later help us to assess the sufficiency and robustness 
of this principle. 
The first guideline for Rawls's duty of assistance has us consider that a well-
ordered society need not be a wealthy society. Partly, it is in this instance that Rawls 
comes to controversially reject, much to the dismay of the cosmopolitans as we will see 
in chapter two, a principle of global distributive justice instead replacing the possibility of 
such a principle with something closer to the just savings principle discussed in A Theory 
of Justice.16 He points out three significant features of just savings in domestic theory that 
relate to the duty of assistance for the international case: 1) The purpose of the principle 
is to establish (reasonably) just basic institutions and to secure a social world that makes 
possible a worthwhile life for all of its citizens; 2) Once just or decent basic institutions 
have been established then savings may stop; and 3) Great wealth is not necessary to 
establish just or decent institutions; the amount needed will depend on the particular 
society's history and its conception of justice.77 Consequently, the wealth between 
peoples will not necessarily be the same. From these three aspects of the just savings 
principle Rawls argues that the duty of assistance expresses the same underlying idea that 
"in each instance, the aim is to realize and preserve just (or decent) institutions, and not 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, §15: 106-112. 
For a fuller explanation of Rawls's conception of a just savings principle refer to Rawls, Johh. A Theory 
of Justice, §44:251-258. 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 106-107. 
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simply increase, much less maximize indefinitely, the average level of wealth, or the 
wealth of any society or particular class in society".78 
As captured by guideline number two, Rawls assumes, political culture, religious 
and philosophical doctrines, and moral traditions that support and sustain the basic 
structure of political and social institutions, all contribute greatly to the unfavourable 
circumstances of a burdened society. Political culture for Rawls is more critical in 
establishing a well-ordered society in comparison to endowments of wealth or resources: 
There is no society anywhere in the world - except for marginal cases -
with resources so scarce that it could not, were it reasonably and rationally 
organized and governed, become well-ordered...The crucial element in 
how a country fares is its political culture - its members' political and 
civic virtues - and not the level of its resources.79 
From this we can see that for Rawls a society's well-orderliness relies heavily on 
its political culture and basic ordering of institutions and not necessarily on the level of 
its wealth or abundance of resources. In recognizing that the political culture of a 
burdened society is all-important and that there is no prescription to get a burdened 
society to change its social and political culture, simply dispensing aid in terms of 
monetary funds, will not suffice for Rawls. Although the two, political cultural progress 
and aid relief, need not be incompatible. Instead he emphasizes that human rights have an 
important role to play in working to change ineffective and poorly ordered regimes.80 
Samuel Freeman points out that "since members of the Society of Peoples have 
reason to care about just institutions and practises, including human rights, for their own 
sake, and not simply because they are themselves benefited, we can see why Rawls 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 107. 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 108, 117. 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 108-109. 
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argues for a duty of assistance for burdened peoples".81 Importantly for Rawls, the human 
right to life includes a minimal or basic right to the means of subsistence as well as 
security.82 In addition to this subsistence for Rawls includes minimum economic 
security}3 In order to uphold and justify a basic right to minimum economic security, 
Rawls affirms, "the sensible and rational exercise of all liberties, of whatever kind, as 
well as the intelligent use of property, always implies having general all-purpose 
economic means".84 Foremost, it is the primary responsibility of a government to provide 
the means of subsistence for its own citizens and for Rawls, "for a government to allow 
its people to starve when starvation is preventable reflects a lack of concern for human 
rights".85 However, when a government is incapable or refuses to provide economic 
means sufficient to meet its citizens subsistence needs, Rawls argues that it is the Society 
of Peoples' responsibility to fulfil this duty.86 This aspect of the duty of assistance will be 
taken up in more depth in chapter three where the broad concept of basic needs will be 
discussed to support my claims that the duty of assistance has the breadth to be a robust 
and sufficient demand. 
The third and final guideline that Rawls distinguishes for his duty of assistance is 
that well-ordered peoples must recognize that the aim of the duty of assistance has a 
target and cut-off point. Recall that the goal of the duty of assistance is to aid burdened 
societies so that they can come to "manage their own affairs reasonably and rationally _ 
Freeman, Samuel. The Law of Peoples, Social Cooperation, Human Rights, and Distributive Justice, 
50. Also see Rawls Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 37. 
'" John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 65. 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 65. 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 65. 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 109. 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 37. 
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and eventually become members of the Society of well-ordered Peoples".87 The final aim 
of assistance is "freedom and equality for the formerly burdened societies"88 and their 
established respect and membership within the Society of Peoples. Similar to the just 
savings principle, once this goal has been attained, the duty to assist that particular people 
is diminished, even if the society in question is still relatively poor. This guideline 
preserves space for the respect of a people's right to self-determination where the 
emphasis is not on economic equality as such, but on the equality and mutual respect 
between peoples under the Law of Peoples. This last feature of the duty of assistance will 
be considered more carefully later in this work. Pushing the boundaries of the possibility 
for political autonomy, political independence, and self-determination and how these 
relate to the welfare of a people will be evaluated. In doing so I will further seek to 
establish the robustness and sufficiency of the duty of assistance. 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 111. 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 111. 
35 
Chapter 2 - The Cosmopolitan Concern: International Egalitarianism 
Some cosmopolitans, distinguishably Kok-Chor Tan, argue that: 
"cosmopolitanism, as a normative idea, takes the individual to be the ultimate unit of 
moral concern and to be entitled to equal consideration regardless of nationality and 
citizenship".1 For Tan and other cosmopolitans principles of justice ought to transcend 
beyond our typically conceived political borders, and ought to apply equally to all 
individuals of the world as a whole. Such claims, as we shall come to evaluate, prove 
problematic for Rawls. This chapter will expound upon Tan's cosmopolitan position in 
defence of international egalitarianism. Additionally, it will present some of the 
cosmopolitan objections made against Rawls. It will explain a cosmopolitan conception 
of global justice theory that includes an international principle of distribution as argued 
for by Tan. This chapter will serve as the antithetical dimension to help us understand 
some of the charges made against Rawls, his rejection of cosmopolitanism, and his 
support of the duty of assistance. It will also help us better evaluate whether Rawls's 
opponents have been fair to his position or have perhaps overlooked crucial aspects of his 
work in The Law of Peoples. 
Cosmopolitanism 
According to Thomas Pogge, there are three elements shared by all cosmopolitan 
positions. Firstly, he cites the common commitment to individualism: "the ultimate units 
of concern are human beings, or persons - rather than, say, family lines, tribes, ethnic, 
Kok-Chor Tan, Justice Without Borders: Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism, and Patriotism (Cambridge, 
MA: Cambridge University Press, 2004.), 1. 
Pogge, Thomas (2002). World Poverty and Human Rights (Polity Press, Maldon, MA), 169. 
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cultural, or religious communities, nations, or states". Secondly, Pogge formulates, the 
cosmopolitan commitment to universality: "the status of ultimate unit of concern attaches 
to every living human being equally - not merely to some subset, such as men, 
aristocrats, Aryans, whites, or Muslims".4 Thirdly, Pogge asserts that all cosmopolitans 
share a commitment to generality: "this special status has global force. Persons are 
ultimate units of concern for everyone - not only for their compatriots, fellow 
religionists, or suchlike".5 As demonstrated by Pogge cosmopolitans, in general, will 
share commitments to equality between each and every individual person where such 
commitments extend beyond our traditional concepts of nationality and other concerns 
for special ties and group membership. 
As mentioned briefly, the cosmopolitan ideal that Tan and others of a like-minded 
position seek to defend is the claim that "the ideal of equal respect and concern applies 
globally to all individuals and not just to citizens within bounded groups".6 Tan qualifies 
the type of cosmopolitanism that he endorses with three crucial comparative distinctions: 
1) the moral versus institutional 2) the strong versus weak, and 3) the moderate versus 
extreme.7 
Pogge, Thomas. World Poverty and Human Rights, 169. 
Pogge, Thomas. World Poverty and Human Rights, 169. 
Pogge, Thomas. World Poverty and Human Rights, 169. 
6
 Kok-Chor Tan. Justice Without Borders, 6. 
7
 For a fuller account see Kok-Chor Tan. Justice Without Borders, 11 -12. In his book, Tan actually cites 
four crucial distinctions in defining the type of cosmopolitan that he himself endorses. For the purposes 
of this work I have omitted the claim about cosmopolitanism as a claim about culture versus 
cosmopolitanism as a claim about justice. 1 have chosen to do so as my thesis relates to 
cosmopolitanism as a claim about justice, the very claim that Tan endorses. In short however, 
cosmopolitan views that seek to make claims about culture and identity deny that membership in a 
particular cultural community is constitutive of a person's social identity and a condition of her 
individual autonomy. Cosmopolitan views that aim to make claims about justice are concerned with the 
scope of justice and hold that social boundaries (ie. Nationality) do not impose principled restrictions on 
the scope of an adequate account of justice. 
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Firstly, he offers a cosmopolitan position that stands to make a moral claim about 
the scope of justice, conversely to those who commit themselves to institutional claims. 
To clarify, Tan distinguishes his moral variety of cosmopolitanism "as a set of moral 
commitments that (morally) justifies the kinds of institutions we may impose on 
o 
individuals". This is contrasted with, asserts Tan, cosmopolitanism "as a system of 
global institutions and organizations that represents a world state of some sort".9 As a 
moral idea, conjectures Tan, cosmopolitanism does not necessarily have to result in the 
support of a world state, nor global citizenship. Rather, the type of cosmopolitanism that 
Tan seeks to endorse is "premised on an account of the equal moral status of individuals, 
and the kinds of reasons, consequently, that must be given to them for the global 
arrangement that we expect them to share". In short, a defence of cosmopolitanism is not 
reducible to a defence of a world state. Despite the explicit cosmopolitan commitment to 
treating individuals as the ultimate units of equal moral worth irrespective of their 
nationality and citizenship, this commitment, argues Tan, does not necessarily entail a 
defence of global governance that embodies a world state. 
Secondly, Tan purports that his cosmopolitan position reflects a strong 
commitment to egalitarianism. This is contrasted with what he identifies as weak 
cosmopolitanism: where the equal moral worth of individuals is still upheld, but this 
commitment is absolved once the baseline of what it takes for individuals to live 
minimally decent lives has been realized.10 To clarify, weak cosmopolitans, according to 
Tan, allow for a certain amount of inequality, in that their egalitarian commitments are 
Kok-Chor Tan. Justice Without Borders, 10. 
9
 Kok-Chor Tan. Justice Without Borders, 10. 
Kok-Chor Tan. Justice Without Borders, 11. 
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realized once a threshold of minimal adequacy is achieved, and anything else outside of 
this minimal baseline, given their position, is not of concern for their variety of 
cosmopolitan justice. Conversely, strong cosmopolitanism "takes the ideal of equal moral 
concern for persons to entail a commitment to some form of global distributive equality, 
and will aim to regulate inequalities between persons, even above the threshold of 
minimal adequacy, against some appropriate distributive principle"." The tension 
between weak and strong cosmopolitans can be described as a contrast between a 
conception of global justice that takes the commitment to the equal moral worth of 
individuals to be understood as respecting the conditions that are universally necessary 
for individuals to lead minimally adequate lives on the one hand, and a conception of 
global justice that pushes beyond the requirement of minimal adequacy on the other hand, 
entailing some version of a global distributive principle. 
The third distinction that Tan addresses is that between extreme and moderate 
cosmopolitanism. According to Tan, extreme cosmopolitanism "holds a reductive view of 
special concern and obligations".12 To clarify, extreme cosmopolitanism requires that any 
concern of moral worth must be justified by cosmopolitan principles. Tan illustrates this 
stating, "Extreme cosmopolitanism takes cosmopolitan morality to be the sole and 
unifying source of value in the sense that all other moral commitments must be justified 
by reference to cosmopolitan principles or goals".13 Moderate cosmopolitanism, as 
identified by Tan, is sympathetic to certain claims of special obligations and "does not 
insist that cosmopolitan values are the only fundamental values by reference to which all 
Kok-Chor Tan. Justice Without Borders, 11. 
12
 Kok-Chor Tan. Justice Without Borders, 11. 
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 Kok-Chor Tan. Justice Without Borders, 11. 
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other values must be justified". As one could easily assume, moderate cosmopolitanism, 
according to Tan, does not take a reductive view of special obligations and thus leaves 
room for their justification outside of cosmopolitan terms and principles. Moderate 
cosmopolitanism, has the advantage over the extreme view, argues Tan, as it "recognizes 
that treating all special obligations as being worthy only because they promote, or are 
derived from, cosmopolitan principles, misrepresents and devalues some of the special 
ties and commitments that matter to people".15 
Thus, Tan's position reflects cosmopolitanism as a moral claim about the scope of 
justice. He seeks to defend a strong cosmopolitanism about justice and argues that 
cosmopolitan justice requires that we take equality between persons as such to be of 
concern and must push this concern for equality beyond the satisfaction of basic 
subsistence. Despite this strong commitment to egalitarianism, Tan rejects extreme 
cosmopolitanism, and consistent with the moderate cosmopolitan view, accepts that 
patriotic ties and commitments have a certain normative independence and worth that are 
not fully reducible to cosmopolitan ideals. In short Tan's goal is to propose a moral 
conception of cosmopolitanism justice that reflects a strong commitment to 
egalitarianism, but requires moderate cosmopolitan justifications in terms of guiding 
moral principles to be adopted internationally. 
Global Justice Versus Humanitarian Assistance 
The substantive aim of the first part of Tan's book is to introduce the view that 
liberals ought also to be cosmopolitan liberals. Throughout Tan's work he stresses both 
"justice" and "cosmopolitan" because he wants to show: a) why we need to talk about 
Kok-Chor Tan. Justice Without Borders, 11. 
Kok-Chor Tan. Justice Without Borders, 12. 
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global justice as opposed to humanitarian assistance (and what is distinctive about the 
two), and b) why global justice must be cosmopolitan in its conception.16 According to 
Tan "some theorists argue, or at least give the impression, that we do not need principles 
of global distributive justice, but only principles of humanitarian assistance to tackle the 
problem of global poverty".17 The most recent and notable proponent of this view, argues 
Tan, is John Rawls. The problem that Tan takes issue with in Rawls's The Law of Peoples 
is: "focusing on humanitarian duties as opposed to justice does not fully locate the source 
of global poverty, and hence falls short of offering a complete solution to it".'8 
Before we can directly address the challenges that Tan proposes for Rawls, firstly 
it is important to distinguish the differences between duties of humanitarian assistance 
and duties of global justice as defined by Tan. Tan argues that, 
Duties of humanitarian assistance differ from duties of justice in two 
interrelated ways: first, duties of humanitarian assistance are limited-term 
commitments with a definable goal (e.g., to raise developing societies to a 
level necessary for sustaining functioning well-ordered social institutions) 
as opposed to duties of justice that would aim to regulate inequalities 
between societies and hence be ongoing without a cut-off point.19 
To clarify, duties of assistance are fulfilled once all societies have managed to reach the 
requisite level of stability and development, whereas duties of justice are continuous, and 
must be enacted so long as inequalities exist between societies. Secondly, "duties of 
humanitarian assistance do not", asserts Tan, "consequently, directly address the global 
Kok-Chor Tan, Justice Without Borders, 19. 
Kok-Chor Tan, Justice Without Borders, 19. 
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structural context within which countries interact, whereas duties of justice apply directly 
to the background structure".20 
In other words, duties of humanitarian assistance reflect limited term 
commitments with definable goals. For example, duties of humanitarian assistance may 
require direct income transfers and/or technology transfers, to raise developing societies 
to a level necessary for sustaining functioning well-ordered social institutions. 
Additionally, duties of humanitarian assistance may require well-off societies to provide 
relief funds for societies imperilled by natural disasters (famine, drought) or recent 
warfare. On the other hand, duties of justice are more encompassing and operate at a 
more fundamental level than what we may call duties of humanitarian assistance. Just to 
reiterate, Tan claims that duties of justice call for standards by which to evaluate, and to 
correct if necessary, the distributive aspects of our global institutions. Duties of justice 
are ongoing, and apply so long as inequalities persist between societies. 
One possible example of how duties of justice could be manifested, as cited by 
Tan and established more fully by Pogge, is the possibility of a permanent taxation 
scheme whereby transfer payments of some form are continually provided to poorer 
countries from richer ones until some semblance of equality is achieved.21 In summation, 
Tan seeks to show that "a theory of global justice would thus not only be concerned with 
the particular actions and foreign policies of individual countries, but, very importantly 
Kok-Chor Tan, Justice Without Borders, 23. 
See Pogge, Thomas (2002). World Poverty and Hitman Rights (Polity Press, Maldon, MA) for a fuller 
account of his General Resource Dividend (GDR). However in this book Pogge is not concerned with 
equality, but rather with severe poverty eradication. For his argument in regards to global equality see 
his 1994 paper "An Egalitarian Law of Peoples", in Philosophy and Public Affairs. 
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and more fundamentally, it would be concerned also with the background global 
institutional context within which countries interact."22 
Tan's Critique of Rawls 
Much of Tan's efforts are focused on responding to Rawls. In general the 
difficulties that Tan has with Rawls can be broken down into three main areas of concern 
that overlap to a certain extent, and I have labelled them a, b, and c. Tan raises two main 
objections against Rawls that can fall under the heading of duties of humanitarian 
assistance versus duties of global justice as I see it. Under this heading Tan is sceptical of 
Rawls's account as it assumes, or does little to address, the difficulty of establishing a 
just global institutional order. Firstly, Tan criticizes Rawls for not exploring distributive 
aspects of the global order, and asserts that a theory of global justice that focuses solely 
on the fulfilment of basic human needs will fall short of correcting global scale poverty 
and inequality. The second difficulty that Tan identifies in Rawls's The Law of Peoples 
under this heading is the concern that Rawls is faulty of relying on explanatory 
nationalism to account for how well a people will fare. Thirdly, Tan takes issue with 
Rawls's commitment to liberal toleration on the international scale and argues that such a 
commitment permits for great inequalities and should not be an aspiration of ideal global 
justice theory. Each of Tan's concerns expressed here will be addressed more fully in the 
proceeding sections. 
Duties of Humanity versus Duties of Justice 
Tan criticizes Rawls for obscuring the difference between duties of humanity and 
duties of justice and accuses Rawls of wrongly creating the impression that we do not 
Kok-Chor Tan, Justice Without Borders, 21. 
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need principles of global distributive justice, but only principles of humanitarian 
assistance to tackle the problem of global poverty.23 For Tan," focusing on humanitarian 
duties as opposed to justice does not fully locate the source of global poverty, and hence 
falls short of offering a complete solution to it".24 As already mentioned, this issue locates 
two possible shortcomings in Rawls's theory of global justice. First, Tan's critique of 
Rawls's dependency on basic human needs and reluctance to account for inequitable 
distributions in the global order will be relayed. The proceeding section will address the 
cosmopolitan accusation that criticizes Rawls for relying on explanatory nationalism in 
his reasoning for how well a. people will fare. 
a) Having Basic Needs Met versus The Promotion of Equality Between Persons 
In chapter three of Justice Without Borders, Tan argues that an account of global 
justice directed only at the fulfilment of individual basic needs and one that ignores the 
distributive aspects of the global order against certain principles of justice creates an 
impoverished account of global justice theory. Tan asks that, "in spite of Rawls's 
endorsement of basic subsistence rights in his theory, as to whether the global moral 
objective should be just that of meeting basic needs, or whether it should also promote 
equality between persons".25 Tan is willing to concede and proposes that Rawls's rights-
based theories of justice found in A Theory of Justice provide an appropriate starting 
point for thinking about global justice. Yet he asserts that Rawls's Law of Peoples falls 
" Kok-Chor Tan, Justice Without Borders, 66. 
" Kok-Chor Tan, Justice Without Borders, ch.3 and ch.4. 
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short in that it does not promote an international egalitarian distributive principle aimed 
at mitigating inequalities as such.26 
As demonstrated above, Tan aims to move beyond rights based approaches 
directed merely at subsistence, and, rather, sets his trajectory at the achievement of 
individual equality. Recall, that the account of cosmopolitan justice that Tan seeks to 
argue for focuses especially on distributive equality, an equality that extends beyond 
ensuring that individuals are able to meet their basic needs. Tan sets his sights at 
constructing a theory of global cosmopolitan justice that would, borrowing from Rawls 
domestic theory of justice, maximize the well-being of the worst-off individual on a 
global scale. So, despite Rawls's own objections to cosmopolitan ideals as previously 
discussed, Tan holds "that a just global distributive scheme would be one which meets 
his second principle of justice - equality of opportunity and the regulation of global 
equality by the difference principle".27 
A significant challenge that Rawls faces, given Tan's critique, is that the Rawlsian 
account of basic rights does not go far enough for the purposes of cosmopolitan justice 
proposed. In order to remain committed to the importance of basic rights, but to extend 
such approaches to cover a theory of distributive justice, Tan argues, "that so long as 
there are great inequalities between people, the basic rights of the poor (or at the very 
least the worst-off) cannot be fully met for a variety of reasons".28 To further support this 
claim, Tan points to the difficulty of relative wealth and the issue of purchasing power. 
Tan holds that the "fulfilment of basic needs is relational in that what people may 
Kok-Chor Tan, Justice Without Borders, 41 . 
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actually purchase with their money (to meet their needs) is dependent on its purchasing 
strength, which in turn depends on how much money other people have."29 Commonly 
held there is understanding, says Tan, that much of the world's disparities and suffering 
are not due to an absolute shortage of resources globally, but rather to a drastic 
maldistribution of these resources. Tan acknowledges that, "while poverty and equality 
are distinct concepts, there is a strong link between the two in that much global poverty 
can be attributed to pervasive inequalities in resource distribution."30 A maldistribution of 
resources, asserts Tan, undermines a person's ability or capacity to have his or her basic 
needs met. Furthermore, great inequalities place the world's poor in a position of 
vulnerability for exploitation, where unfair trade and labour terms may be forced upon 
those with less purchasing and barging power. These types of exploitation directly 
threaten one's basic right to subsistence.31 From this, concludes Tan, "equality matters 
because it affects how people will fare at the minimum level."32 
In chapter four of Justice Without Borders, Tan reiterates that, "what is lacking in 
Rawls's account of global justice is the commitment to distributive justice."33 He 
complains that there is no ongoing distributive principle that would seek to regulate 
inequalities beyond the duty of assistance that demands the better-off aid the burdened 
until they (the burdened) are "able to meet a certain threshold level of basic needs".34 Tan 
worries that, Rawls's theory falls short of being ideal, in that it does not seek to narrow 
gaps between the rich and poor and this is problematic due to the reasons mentioned 
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above. Tan admits that, "in a sense, the aim of this work is to show how a commitment to 
the basic right to subsistence (the agreed fixed point) leads to a commitment to the right 
to a certain level of social and economic equality (the more contentious claim)."35 
As we have come to understand, the challenge that Tan proposes for Rawls is that 
perhaps an ideal theory of global justice should demand more than just the provision of 
"basic subsistence rights" (to use Tan's words) and would rather seek to establish 
equality between persons. Despite the persuasiveness and admirable merits of Tan's 
account, my response is that Tan has not been entirely fair in his portrayal of Rawls's 
position. I would argue that Tan is a bit quick and hasty, in that he collapses the ideas of 
basic subsistence rights and Rawlsian basic needs, which I think is a flawed and unfair 
move. To my understanding, and as demonstrated in chapter one of this work, Rawls's 
idea of basic needs extends beyond rights of basic subsistence. It appears to me that Tan 
falsely conflates the two ideas of basic subsistence and Rawlsian basic needs when there 
is a distinction to be made, and an important one at that. It is notable that Rawls, in The 
Law of Peoples, does promote certain types of equality between persons...civil and 
political equalities, equality of opportunity...but not necessarily equality of wealth and 
this should not be overlooked.36 Additionally, Rawls expresses that by basic needs, he 
means, "roughly those that must be met if citizens are to be in a position to take 
advantage of the rights, liberties, and opportunities of their society. These needs include 
economic means as well as institutional rights and freedoms".37 It appears to me that Tan 
Kok-Chor Tan, Justice Without Borders, 47 n 11. 
Although there is the promotion of certain measures of equality and liberty argued for in The Law of 
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has hastily dismissed this crucial distinction in Rawls's work. However, I am willing to 
concede that Rawls's notion of basic needs is perhaps underdeveloped, and this will be 
addressed in chapter three of this work. That said, it is unfair of Tan to be so critical of 
Rawls's commitment to basic needs, when Tan himself has not fully considered the extent 
of this commitment. Despite this, the issue still remains that Rawls rejects and Tan 
demands global distributive equality between both peoples and individuals. 
b) Accusations of Explanatory Nationalism 
Just as Rawls considers race, gender, talents, wealth, and other natural and social 
particularities "arbitrary from a moral point of view",38 so too, argue Pogge, Beitz, and 
Tan, that factors like a person's nationality and citizenship are morally arbitrary as well.39 
They argue that just "as the effects of these contingencies on a person's life chances in the 
domestic sphere are to be nullified by certain distributive principles of justice, so too 
should the effects of global contingencies be mitigated by certain global distributive 
principles".40 Thus they conclude that, "Rawls's principles of justice - including the 
second principle governing social and economic equality - should apply between 
individuals across societies and not just within the borders of a single society".41 
Tan complains that Rawls ignores the problem of global institutional order and 
relies too heavily on explanatory nationalism to account for how well a people will fare. 
Tan argues, independently from the point of explanatory nationalism that "if we accept 
that rich countries have only a duty of humanity to poorer countries, we are also 
Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice, 15. 
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accepting that the existing baseline resource and wealth distribution is a just one, and that 
the global basic institutions organized around and legitimizing the prevailing allocation 
of wealth and resources are acceptable".42 According to Tan duties to assist take place 
and perhaps assume a just institutional framework while duties of justice identify what 
counts as a just distribution in the first place and speak directly to the basic structure that 
duties of humanity assume. 
To further contribute to Tan's critique and as a means of clarification, in his work 
"Do Rawls's Two Theories of Justice Fit Together?" Pogge accuses Rawls of committing 
what he characterizes as potentially the "most harmful dogma ever conceived: 
explanatory nationalism".43 Pogge defines explanatory nationalism as "the idea that 
causes of severe poverty and of other human deprivations are domestic to the societies in 
which they occur".44 Pogge poses the question: "If the suffering of the poor abroad is due 
to local causes, then our only moral question is the one Rawls asks: whether and how 
much we ought to 'assist' them".45 For Pogge this question fails to accurately capture 
external global factors that contribute to the impoverished conditions of many nations. 
Explanatory nationalism fails to ask about whether and how rich countries, especially 
through the global institutional order we design and impose may contribute to and sustain 
their deprivations. Pogge argues, "explanatory nationalism pre-empts the need for a 
.principle of global distributive justice, which would guide the design of the rules of the 
Kok-Chor Tan, Justice Without Borders, 66. 
See Pogge, Thomas. (2006). "Do Rawls's Two Theories of Justice Fit Together?" , p.217 in Rawls's Law 
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world economy in light of their distributive effects, by assuring us that these rules do not 
have significant distributive effects".46 
For Pogge explanatory nationalists fall prey to two illusions: 1) they are overly 
impressed by the great diversity of national development trajectories, and 2) they see the 
relevant nation-specific factors as home-grown.47 The second illusion is much more 
directed at Rawls and so we will focus our attention here. Pogge appears to challenge 
Rawls's initial assumption that stipulates that much of a peoples' success and ability to be 
well-ordered originates from their political culture that underlies their basic institutions. 
He appears sceptical of Rawls's assertion that much of the suffering in poorer societies 
are results of ineffective regimes, poorly ordered institutions, oppressive governments, 
and corrupt elites. Pogge is willing to concede that corruption and oppression are evils 
that contribute to the miseries of many societies, but he asks: how is a political culture of 
corruption or oppression initially fostered and sustained? There is a distinct possibility 
that the domestic factors that Rawls cites are themselves shaped and sustained by external 
factors, argues Pogge. From this critique we can see that a potential deficiency in Rawls's 
account is that he only considers local factors in determining the conditions that result in 
a burdened society. 
In response to this concern that The Law of Peoples does nothing to alleviate 
current global injustices that arise much more from what explanatory globalism claims 
Pogge, Thomas. "Do Rawls's Two Theories of Justice Fit Together?", 217. Pogge proposes a strategy of 
distributive justice, what he calls a General Resource Dividend (GDR) similar to that of Tan. For Pogge 
due to the harms that wealthy nations inflict on the global poor, wealthy nations possess a negative duty 
not to harm and must seek to mitigate these harms through a re-distribution of their wealth. They are 
obligated to re-distribute their wealth, according to Pogge because such nations have unjustly and 
harmfully acquired their power, resources, and capital from poorer nations through oppression, 
enslavement, colonialism, imperialism, corruption, manipulation, and the like. For more also see Pogge, 
Thomas (2002). World Poverty and Human Rights (Polity Press, Maldon, MA). 
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than from the claims expressed by explanatory nationalism that Rawls focuses on, 
Samuel Freeman charges that Pogge ignores the fact that The Law of Peoples is drawn up 
for the ideal case of well-ordered peoples.4g As we have already discussed and as 
Freeman so persuasively points out: 
The Law of Peoples includes a duty of peoples to provide for material and 
other conditions that enable all peoples to be politically autonomous and 
independent. These and other requirements should protect less-advantaged 
peoples from being corrupted by powerful political and economic interests 
abroad.49 
Due to the fact that principles that govern the Society of Peoples are decided from 
behind a thick veil of ignorance and that the duty of assistance's target is to bring up 
burdened societies to the point of at least reasonably decent well-orderliness, it follows 
that the current conditions of our global circumstance appear to be neutralized given 
Rawls's framework. 
The prospect of being able to assist a burdened people, so that they may become 
full members in the society of peoples who can provide for the basic needs of their 
citizens and assert political independence on the global stage has undeniable appeal. 
However, whether this possibility, has the attractiveness to sway Rawls's critics who hold 
that corruption is inevitable so long as inequalities persist is questionable.50 Freeman 
responds to those, like Pogge and Tan, who conjecture that corruption and injustice will 
See Freeman, Samuel. "Distributive Justice and The Law of Peoples", 251 in Rawls's Law of Peoples: A 
Realistic Utopia? eds. Rex Martin & David A. Reidy. Blackwell Publishing: Maiden, MA. and "The 
Law of Peoples, Social Cooperation, Human Rights, and Distributive Justice, 64. 
Freeman, Samuel. "The Law of Peoples, Social Cooperation, Human Rights, and Distributive Justice", 
64. 
Recall Tan's criticism. Also, refer to Pogge, "An Egalitarian Law of Peoples", 213. Pogge further argues 
against the inequality of wealth allowed by Rawls's account, saying that "relative poverty breed 
corruptibility and corruption", and that "it is entirely unrealistic to expect that such foreign sponsored 
corruption can be eradicated without reducing the enormous differentials in per capit GNP. (ibid., 213, 
214) 
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persist so long as there is relative inequalities by stating that arguments of this sort 
"largely involve empirical conjectures about the capacity for political autonomy, and the 
workings of an economy, both domestically, and worldwide, under conditions of a well-
ordered Society of Peoples".51 Given that Rawls has constructed membership of the 
Society of Peoples for the ideal case, where members uphold values of mutual respect 
and reciprocity, it follows that many of these power-struggle type worries have been 
safeguarded against, thus making the duty of assistance appear as a potentially robust and 
sufficient demand. 
As an additional complement to Freeman's argument I assert that once one comes 
to appreciate Rawls's insistence on making respect for political culture of a burdened 
society all important one can, with good reason, recognize that this demand is no small 
feat as it speaks of preserving significant space for respect of a people's self-
determination making the worry of corruption and manipulation less concerting. This 
idea is reinforced by the construction of the Society of Peoples derived from the 
international original position that Rawls proposes. Part of the challenge to be discussed 
later in this work will be to assess whether Rawls has a convincing argument for asserting 
that the members in his Society of Peoples manage to attain political autonomy, 
independence, and self-determination given his global original position. 
Distorting the Distinction of Duties of Humanity and Duties of Justice 
As previously mentioned, Tan, and other cosmopolitans similarly argue that some 
sort of egalitarian distributive principle is necessary to attain a fully ideal sense of global 
Freeman, Samuel. "The Law of Peoples, Social Cooperation, Human Rights, and Distributive Justice", 
65. 
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justice. Despite this, Tan sees two main arguments operating in Rawls's The Law of 
Peoples that lead to Rawls's rejection of global distributive justice as such. Firstly, there 
is the issue of redundancy, that Tan asserts leads to Rawls's rejection of a global principle 
of distributive justice. Secondly, there is the issue of respect of political autonomy, that 
Tan recognizes as a crucial reason as to why Rawls has rejected cosmopolitan global 
justice. 
Tan conjectures that "since a duty of humanitarian assistance is already required 
by the Law of Peoples as part of non-ideal theory, global principles of distributive justice 
would be redundant" according to Rawls.52 Tan directs us to the citation in The Law of 
Peoples that stipulates that "these goals of attaining liberal or decent institutions, securing 
human rights, and meeting basic needs... are [sufficiently] covered by the duty of 
assistance,"53 and thus a global distributive principle serves no additional purpose in this 
regard. Given this, however, Tan agues "this argument obscures an important difference 
between duties of humanity and duties of justice, a difference that is more than 
semantic".54 As previously discussed, Tan asserts that 
If we accept that rich countries have only a duty of humanity to poorer 
countries, we are also accepting that the existing baseline resource and 
wealth distribution is a just one, and that the global basic institutions 
organized around and legitimizing the prevailing allocation of wealth and 
resources are acceptable.55 
Duties to assist take place and perhaps assume a just institutional framework argues Tan. 
This faulty assumption, for Tan, will result in an incomplete theory of ideal global justice 
and will allow for great and pervasive inequalities. 
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Tan highlights that duties of humanity aim to redistribute wealth, whereas, duties 
of justice identify what counts as a just distribution in the first place. He reiterates 
"Justice is concerned with structural equality of some form, whereas humanitarianism is 
concerned primarily with the meeting of basic needs (even if structural changes are called 
for to this end)".56 However, it is notable that the duty of assistance is set up for the ideal 
case among respectful and equal peoples who are sufficiently politically independent and 
autonomous. It appears to me that possibly the framework that Tan speaks of has already 
been accounted for in Rawls's construction of the ideal Society of Peoples by use of his 
global original position. 
As previously discussed, Rawls's global original position takes place behind 'a 
thick veil of ignorance' where a representative does not know whether a neighboring 
people is liberal, decent, or an outlaw regime. The size of a territory, abundance of capital 
and resources, or strength in relation with other peoples is also concealed. The actors, 
peoples, in Rawls's global original position enter the contractual agreement from a 
symmetrical position. They regard one another as free and equal and are prepared to grant 
the same proper respect and recognition to other peoples as equals. Embedded in this 
framework, as Rawls sets it up is that part of a people's being reasonable and rational 
entails that they are ready to offer other peoples fair terms of political and social 
cooperation. Recall that from behind the veil of ignorance members in the Society of 
Peoples agree to a duty of civility. This duty requires that members in the Society of 
Peoples offer other peoples public reasons appropriate to the Society of Peoples for their 
Kok-ChorTan, Justice Without Borders, 68. 
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actions. By definition, as discussed, peoples exhibit a moral nature and are willing to 
comply with their duties under the Law of Peoples and seek stability, then for the right 
reasons. They do not take advantage of other peoples, even if it would be favorable to do 
so. By virtue of their constructed characters, the original position among liberal peoples 
and decent peoples, seems set up so that the necessity of redistribution to mitigate the 
harms Pogge and Tan discuss appear somewhat superfluous. When we further add that 
one of the conditions required for toleration and membership into the Society of Peoples 
requires a genuine concern for the meeting of basic needs and respect for human rights, to 
be discussed in chapter III, again the objections made against Rawls appear less 
concerting. 
The second argument that Tan attributes to Rawls's rejection of cosmopolitan 
global justice is the possibility that global distributive principles, given Rawls's account, 
may produce unacceptable results. To clarify, Rawls asserts that in order to uphold the 
principles of liberalism, that is respect for a peoples' self determination and political 
autonomy, it would be inappropriate to adopt an ongoing principle of distributive justice, 
one that would apply so long as there are inequalities between societies. An ongoing 
principle of global distributive justice would be especially controversial and problematic, 
given Rawls's commitment to self-determination when inequalities have grown out of 
choices in political policy, such as population control, and industrial practises versus 
pastoral models of advancement.58 This is unacceptable for Rawls's, asserts Tan, because: 
A global egalitarian principle would insist, in both of these cases, that 
resources be transferred from the wealthier societies to the poorer ones, 
even though both may have started with an equal amount of wealth and 
57
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resources. And this is unacceptable for it would mean penalizing some 
societies for their sound domestic policies in order to compensate other 
societies for their careless policies.59 
Tan claims, "distributive principles would insist on redistribution as long as there is 
inequality between peoples no matter what the case of this inequality - that Rawls takes 
exception to".60 Tan argues that "implicit in Rawls's argument...is the distinction between 
inequality as a result of choice and inequality due to circumstance".61 
The choice/circumstance distinction highlighted above reflects a potential reason 
as to why Rawls rejects a global principle of distribution. A global principle of 
distribution would yield unacceptable results, as we would not be able to discriminate 
between societies which "through foresight and prudence have increased their wealth, 
and societies which through neglect and imprudence have squandered theirs". Tan frames 
Rawls argument as stating: that type of distribution required by a global principle of 
distribution would be unacceptable as it stands to penalize some societies for their sound 
domestic policies in order to compensate other societies for their careless policies. Tan 
explains by analogy that just as a domestic distributive scheme ought not to compensate 
individuals for their poor choices by taking from those who have made good choices, 
neither ought a global scheme seek to compensate societies for their poor governance and 
policies by penalizing other societies for their good governance and sound policy 
making.62 The crucial and contentious premises of this argument that Tan points out are: 
1) adoption of sound social and economic policies are largely internal and freely adopted 
Kok-Chor Tan, Justice Without Borders, 69. 
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by a society, and 2) the well-being of a society can be reduced to domestic factors such as 
political culture and civic virtues. 
The aim of distributive justice, according to Tan, is to counter the effects of 
inequalities resulting from circumstance that individuals have had to endure and not from 
their personal choices. Rawls's worry in contrast to this is that a global distributive 
principle would be insensitive to this choice/circumstance distinction. Conversely Tan 
argues that in principle a global egalitarian order could allow room for inequalities due to 
differences in national pursuits. He holds that "distributive arrangements between 
societies need not be insensitive to choice, then if the distributive goal is to offset the 
effects of these (unchosen) global factors and not the effects of (chosen) national policies 
on a people's well-being".63 When aimed at repairing or reconciling misfortune and 
inequalities due to global factors, Tan asserts that such subsidies are not unfair in this 
instance. Rather, distributions are compensation for the effects of an unjust global 
arrangement suffered by a burdened and disadvantaged society. Tan regards such 
distributions as ensuring that each society and individual receives his or her fair share as 
required by a just global arrangement. In addition, Tan highlights that "what is required is 
that the background context in which societies pursue their diverse ends is a fair one, and 
this would require its regulation by some distributive ideal".64 
Tan holds that the choice/circumstance distinction falsely leads us to ask why 
should citizens in better-off societies be obliged to assist the worst-off when success or 
failure is a result of choice and policy making. The insistence on redistribution, Tan 
recognizes, in this instance offends against the very basic moral intuition that rational 
Kok-Chor Tan, Justice Without Borders, 71. 
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agents are to take responsibility for their choices. However, if explanatory globalism is 
true, asserts Tan, then not all inequalities can be blamed on poor domestic choices. 
Rather some inequalities can be attributed to global factors outside of the control of most 
poor, burdened, and disadvantaged societies. He argues that the aim of global justice is 
not to compensate peoples for their bad choices, but to mitigate the unfairness in global 
conditions and this need not be morally offensive.65 Additionally, even if we accept the 
explanatory nationalism thesis, conjectures Tan, it does not follow that a global 
distributive principle would violate this. 
Another useful analogy to highlight the suspicious nature of rejecting global 
egalitarianism on the basis of the choice/circumstance distinction is relayed by Charles 
Beitz. Beitz explains that the domestic equivalent to the case of citizens fairing poorly 
due to bad policies of their own governments is not that of an individual having to bear 
the consequences of her own bad choices, rather the more accurate analogy resembles 
that of children who have to suffer for the poor choices of their parents.66 His analogy 
draws attention to the problem of future generations and intergenerational justice, where 
citizens will have to bear the consequences of policies made perhaps before their time. It 
highlights the consideration that birthplace is supposed to be a morally irrelevant 
circumstance, yet citizens on Rawls's account appear to be either recipients of good 
fortune or victims of circumstance given which society - be it liberal, decent, burdened, 
or outlaw - they are born into. 
Accidents of birth, as just stated, are to bear no moral significance on an 
individual's opportunities or on how well an individual is to fair in the pursuit of a 
Kok-Chor Tan, Justice Without Borders, 72. 
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reasonably decent life, as previously argued for by Rawls in his domestic theory. 
However, the choice/circumstance distinction when applied to the international case calls 
into question his previous theoretical liberal reasoning. Tan points out that citizens of 
disadvantaged societies in the Law of Peoples are held accountable for the unsound 
domestic policies of their state. This is even the case, holds Tan, when the majority had 
no part in the making of these policies. This argues Tan is inconsistent with Rawls's own 
moral individualism expressed in A Theory of Justice.67 Tan asserts, "while Rawls's 
moral individualism sets firm limits on the extent to which collective decisions may 
affect individual well-being in his domestic conception of justice, there seem to be no 
similar limitations in his international theory".68 The choice/circumstance distinction that 
Tan regards as implicit in Rawls's reasons for rejecting global egalitarianism, makes 
sense when applied individualistically, but collapses when applied collectively. 
To further support my overall thesis and initial claim that Rawls's opponents are 
not entirely fair to his position, I think it is somewhat safe to conjecture that Tan may in 
this instance be guilty of misconstruing Rawls's position. To clarify, Tan says "just as a 
domestic distributive scheme ought not to compensate individuals for their poor choices 
by taking from those who have made good choices, neither ought a global scheme to 
compensate societies for their poor governance by penalizing other societies for their 
good governance".69 I worry as to whether the use of the term governance is the best 
choice of language to capture Rawls's intention. I find the use of 'governance' quite a 
distortion as Rawls's motivation of non-intervention comes from his reliance on the 
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notions of mutual reciprocity and toleration. Furthermore, his liberal commitment to 
achieving stability for the right reasons by exhibiting respect for self-determination along 
with his attachment to the value of political culture used to foster political autonomy 
through non-intervention and toleration additionally contribute to Rawls's unwillingness 
to advocate for a continuous principle of global distribution. This reflects a desire to 
avoid the objection of parochialism as Rawls intends that The Law of Peoples will remain 
reasonable to both liberal and decent peoples. 
In addition to this, Tan either intentionally or mistakenly overlooks the 
commitment that the duty of assistance is set up to aid burdened peoples, whom are the 
victims of poor governance to a certain extent. The second guideline of the duty of 
assistance stipulates that financial aid will not suffice to rectify basic political and social 
injustices. Rawls asserts that the duty of assistance, with its "emphasis on human rights 
may work to change ineffective regimes and the conduct of the rulers who have been 
callous about the well-being of their own people".70 This insistence on human rights, 
conjectures Rawls, will "help to prevent famines from developing, and will exert pressure 
in the direction of effective governments in a well-ordered Society of Peoples".71 It 
appears odd to me that Tan has perhaps, deemphasized Rawls's insistence on human 
rights as a measure of good governance and well-orderliness. 
Rawis, John. The Law of Peoples, 109. The second guideline of the duty of assistance, recall, says that 
the political culture of a burdened society is all-important, more so than relative wealth or resources. 
Rawls conjectures that "there is no society anywhere in the world - except for marginal cases - with 
resources so scarce that it could not, were it reasonably and rationally organized and governed, become 
well-ordered". 
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Tan argues that there is room for both global distributive justice and national self-
determination, and that these are not incompatible goals. Much of this is derived from the 
reasoning: 
That considerations of justice aim to secure equal opportunity and fair 
background conditions for persons and societies in the pursuit of their 
ends, but it does not necessarily require that everyone and every society 
take full advantage of the opportunities presented to them, nor does it 
compensate those who fail to make successful use of the opportunities 
available to them. There is space, then, under a global distributive scheme 
for diversity in national pursuits, and for nations to take responsibility for 
their domestic goals. The aim of justice is to secure a fair background 
context within which rules individuals and their associations can make 
choices and take responsibility for them.72 
Tan emphasizes that justice requires a global arrangement in which the least advantaged 
are to be most benefited by such arrangements. To further convince us that distributive 
justice and self-determination need not be competing ideals Tan adds that "what is unjust, 
and what distributive justice aims to mitigate, is the background condition within which 
self-determination is exercised, not the outcome as such of self-determination".73 Again, 
it is apparent that Tan challenges Rawls's initial assumption that it is possible for a well-
ordered people to exercise political autonomy, be economically self-sufficient, and not be 
subject to manipulation by external forces. Samuel Freeman points out that "Rawls's 
critics seem to question the crucial assumption of the independence of peoples under 
ideal conditions of a well-ordered Society of Peoples".74 
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c) The Difficulty of Rawlsian Toleration 
In chapter four of Justice Without Borders, Tan claims that Rawls's rejection of 
cosmopolitanism reveals a fundamental shift in Rawls's political philosophy. Tan 
characterizes Rawls as "starting at purportedly liberal individualistic grounds...[and]... 
arrives at an international theory that is more aligned with those of communitarians..,"75 
In part Rawls's reason for making this shift from individuals in the domestic case to 
peoples in the international sphere is that having the Law of Peoples founded on the ideal 
of individuals as free and equal would make the basis of that Law "too narrow". It would 
be limiting in that to insist on an international theory of justice premised on the 
cosmopolitan ideal that individuals are the ultimate concern of moral worth is to propose 
a conception of justice that nonliberal societies could reasonably object to.76 Recall that 
the international original position requires a two stage thought experiment. A single 
global original position, argues Tan, would have to assume that all individuals "have 
equal liberal rights of citizens in a constitutional democracy... that only a liberal 
democratic society can be acceptable".77 Given that Rawls is committed to extending his 
notion of reasonable pluralism from the domestic to the international sphere, which 
acknowledges a respect for varying comprehensive doctrines provided that these 
doctrines are pursued in ways compatible with a reasonable political conception of justice 
and its public reason, it would appear inconsistent to assert that only the liberal 
democratic ordering of society is acceptable.78 This commitment to reasonable pluralism 
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for Rawls provides the foundation for his expression of due toleration and acceptance of 
non-liberal, but decent peoples into the Society of Peoples. 
Tan argues that liberals should treat accommodation of decent hierarchical 
peoples, for example, as a modus vivendi, a non-ideal scenario, rather than a matter of 
toleration as required by ideal theory.79 Tan claims that it is problematic that Rawls 
argues that liberalism has to be accepting of well-ordered though non-liberal modes of 
ordering society, similarly to the political liberal idea of tolerating non-liberal but 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Tan proposes that this analogy between the 
domestic and international spheres does not hold.80 This is especially the case, argues 
Tan, when we consider the impact that certain policies will have on individuals of a 
certain type of society. Tan discusses the examples of the two distinct societies that 
Rawls gives where one society chooses to industrialize and the other remains pastoral.81 
This difference in policies over time results in a difference of wealth between these two 
societies. Due to this disparity, Tan identifies a tension between Rawls's conception of 
toleration and respect for a people's self-determination contrary to an endorsement of 
liberal egalitarianism that would be upheld by a principle of distribution, be it the 
difference principle. For Tan, ideal liberal theory should be egalitarian and cosmopolitan 
in conception. From this he argues that "A Law of Peoples that regards hierarchical 
decent societies as societies in good standing in the society of peoples, and thatjolerates 
great inequalities between states as part of its ideal theory, sets our sights too low".82 
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Despite Rawls's insistence on toleration for non-liberal but decent peoples, Tan 
asks: "Is it true that political liberalism would fail to express due toleration of other 
acceptable ways...of ordering society, if it insisted on some liberal conception of 
distributive justice (e.g. Rawls's own second principle) as part of an international 
theory?"83 Tan cites Rawls's first presentation of the Law of Peoples, where Rawls writes 
that nonliberal societies would reject any liberal distributive principles between societies 
because they reject liberalism. Tan asserts that this argument is too quickly made and 
further argues that: 
It is not clear why the rejection of liberal principles has to be an all-or-
nothing affair. Just because nonliberal societies reject (as they likely 
would) liberal principles pertaining to the full range of liberal civil and 
political rights, it does not follow at all that they will also reject libera] 
principles pertaining to economic and social rights.84 
Additionally, Tan asserts that it would not be inconsistent for a society to reject some so-
called liberal values, such as free association and expression, but at the same time 
endorse global principles that will distribute resources more equally between societies. 
"To put it simply," clarifies Tan, "nonliberal societies can accept, as principles governing 
the relations between societies, liberal principles of economic justice even as they reject 
liberal principles of political justice".85 
For Tan, "Rawls has to agree that it is consistent for nonliberal peoples to endorse 
liberal egalitarian ideals to regulate relations between societies even as they reject the 
same ideal for their own domestic institutions".86 Despite this possibility; however, within 
Rawls's theory Tan notes that the above argument will not go far enough for 
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cosmopolitans as it only accounts for equality between societies. Recall that 
cosmopolitan justice, according to Tan, "requires more than distributive equality between 
societies, it also calls for distributive equalities within societies" and their individuals.87 
Tan's cosmopolitan goal, as said before, would be to maximize the life prospects of the 
globally worst-off individuals no matter where they reside. 
In summation, Rawls in his work The Law of Peoples objects to such egalitarian 
demands because adopting a distributive principle would undermine liberalism's principle 
of toleration by requiring that all societies conform to liberal egalitarian standards. For 
Tan the shift from domestic individualism to international communitarianism cannot be 
justified within a liberal individualist framework. Tan has sought to demonstrate that the 
fundamental reason why Rawls asserts that the cosmopolitan ideal is unacceptable is the 
fact of reasonable pluralism. In Rawls's view, justice among peoples should differ from 
justice within a state, not ultimately because of the absence of enforceable international 
law, as one might suggest, but because he thinks the scope of reasonable pluralism ought 
to be broadened in the global context. Tan has attempted to convince us as to why 
relaxing this criterion of reasonableness is objectionable from the liberal point of view. 
He has tried to convince his readers that Rawls's commitment to toleration is 
objectionable, in that toleration derived from Rawls's reasonable pluralism insufficiently 
addresses pervasive inequalities both between societies, and between the inhabiting 
individuals. 
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Conclusion 
It has been shown that Tan argues, in contradiction to Rawls, that liberals should 
treat international accommodation of reasonable peoples as a modus vivendi, a non-ideal 
scenario, rather than a matter of toleration as required by ideal theory. Tan has presented 
the idea that the aim of an ideal theory of justice is to provide us with a standard to aspire 
to. Rawls's Law of Peoples falls short, for Tan, because hierarchical decent peoples are 
regarded as members in good standing in the society of peoples. For Tan this tolerates 
great inequality between states, and even more so between individuals of the globe, and 
as an ideal theory, sets our sights too low. 
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Chapter 3 - Which Needs are Basic Needs? 
In his work The Law of Peoples, Social Cooperation, Human Rights, and 
Distributive Justice, Samuel Freeman highlights that the duty of assistance is keyed to the 
broader concept of basic needs. He argues that it is suggestive in Rawls's The Law of 
Peoples that the duty of assistance extends beyond meeting a burdened peoples' 
subsistence needs where subsistence needs are understood to be simply food, water, 
shelter, clothing.1 However, it is not very clear what the broader concept of basic needs 
entails precisely. Freeman acknowledges that Rawls says too little here and that this area 
in The Law of Peoples is perhaps underdeveloped. I argue that despite this, the duty of 
assistance should not be undervalued as the demand of meeting basic needs has the 
potential to again be quite robust. Many have charged Rawls with having a truncated list 
of human rights and an impoverished account of global justice, but if we charitably and 
critically come to acknowledge that Rawls's understanding of basic rights includes 
subsistence and economic security it is arguable that his duty of assistance may be both 
robust and sufficient. 
To clarify, Rawls understands basic rights to include subsistence and economic 
security, meaning that a people must be able to provide the minimal necessities such as 
food and shelter, along with economic security that according to Rawls allows citizens 
the ability to exercise all of their liberties and make intelligent use of property. Under 
Rawls's conception basic needs include the necessary essentials that typically support 
biological human functioning. In addition, basic needs identify certain mechanisms of 
Freeman, Samuel. "The Law of Peoples, Social Cooperation, Human Rights, and Distributive Justice", 
51. 
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institutional support required by citizens that are necessary for individuals to be able to 
take advantage of the rights, liberties, and opportunities of their society. For Rawls these 
needs include economic means as well as institutional rights and freedoms.2 This chapter 
will seek to further flush out Rawls's definition of basic needs with some supplemental 
considerations as to what may be required in the fulfilment of basic needs in an effort to 
support my overarching thesis that perhaps the duty of assistance is at the least robust, if 
not sufficient despite arguments made in favour of an international distributive principle. 
Within the confines of this chapter, two points must be distinguished and made 
clear. The first point being the clarification of basic needs where I will attempt to fill in 
the blanks left by Rawls in his account. The second point that I will need to distinguish 
will be dependant on the clarification of the first. The second point, relying on the first, 
will seek to show that once we have a clear understanding of Rawls's robust conception 
of basic needs, it will follow that assistance securing these defined basic needs is 
sufficient and that we need not push much further, as suggested by Tan, in seeking to 
establish a type of cosmopolitan global equality between individuals given the framework 
of the Law of Peoples.3 
Global Justice - A Matter of Equality or Sufficiency? 
To begin our discussion on the clarification of basic needs as required by a 
suitable theory of global justice, it is important to draw a distinction between two 
competing principles that have thus far shaped our understanding of global justice and the 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 38 n 47. 
3
 Miller, David (2007). National Responsibility and Global Justice (Oxford University Press, New York, 
NY) Miller poses the question: "should global justice be understood as requiring some kind of equality 
between people everywhere, or is there a better way of understanding it? Should we think instead in 
terms of a global minimum level of rights and resources below which no one should be allowed to fall, 
and if so how should we decide where to set this threshold?" p.5 
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basic needs entailed from it in this work. The cosmopolitan position explored in chapter 
two of this work highlighted principles commonly held by egalitarians. Although it may 
not seem obvious at this time, chapter one of this work investigated Rawls's concerns of 
what the foreign policy of a reasonably just liberal people should be, and in doing so 
relayed a type of sufficientarian conception of global justice among peoples. 
Cosmopolitanism in Brief 
Recall that in its strongest formulation cosmopolitanism "takes the ideal of equal 
moral concern for persons to entail a commitment to some form of global distributive 
equality, and will aim to regulate inequalities between persons, even above the threshold 
of minimal adequacy, against some appropriate distributive principle". Egalitarians hold 
that individuals are to be regarded as the ultimate units of equal moral worth and this 
concern transcends traditionally defined borders. Global egalitarians seek to promote the 
well-being of the world's worst off irrespective of nationality and citizenship. Principles 
of egalitarianism tend to assume that it is intrinsically undesirable or unfair if some 
individuals are worse-off compared to others through no fault of their own. Equality on 
this view has considerable moral value in itself. Borrowing from Rawls's domestic theory, 
many egalitarians argue that the only acceptable inequalities are those that are to the 
advantage of the worst-off. 
The Doctrine of Sufficiency 
Sufficientarianism, on the other hand, insists that when evaluating possible 
distributions, what matters is whether individuals have enough not to fall below some 
Tan, Kok-Chor. Justice Without Borders, ] ] . 
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critical threshold of advantage.5 Typically, what matters regarding sufficiency is whether 
individuals have enough. Paula Casal identifies two main theses operating within the 
structure of the sufficiency position. She notes that there exist both: a) the positive thesis 
- that stresses the importance of people living above a certain threshold, and b) the 
negative thesis - that denies the relevance of certain additional requirements. 
In Equality as a Moral Ideal, Harry Frankfurt develops the positive thesis, what 
he simply refers to as the doctrine of sufficiency, as such: "What is important from the 
point of view of morality is not that everyone should have the same but that each should 
have enough."1 Roger Crisp offers a more recent formulation of the positive thesis, which 
he labels the compassion principle, where "absolute priority is to be given to benefits to 
those below the threshold at which compassion enters". The qualification that Crisp adds 
to his compassion principle is that only nontrivial benefits possess such priority: "Below 
the threshold, benefiting people matters more the worse off those people are, the more of 
those people there are, and the greater the size of the benefit in question. Above the 
threshold, or in cases concerning only trivial benefits below the threshold, no priority is 
to be given." 
This moderate yet substantial requirement, to eliminate deprivations to a minimal 
threshold of sufficiency, is a view that has wide appeal and acceptability. Casal notes, 
"Except among Hobbesians and libertarians, it is increasingly difficult to find views that 
do not accept some version of the positive thesis".9 We would be hard pressed to find a 
Casal, Paula. "Why Sufficiency is Not Enough", 297. 
6
 Casal, Paula. "Why Sufficiency is Not Enough", 297-298. 
Frankfurt, Harry. "Equality as a Moral Ideal", 21. 
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compelling argument that denies the elimination of certain types of deprivations such as 
hunger, disease, lack of shelter, illiteracy, and poor access to education as minimal 
political requirements that should be secured within a just institutional framework. More 
familiar to us at this point is Rawls's view in the domestic case that a just society will 
guarantee a social minimum and that any reasonable conception of justice will favour 
"measures ensuring for all citizens adequate all-purpose means to make effective use of 
their freedoms".10 This sentiment reverberates on the global scale for Rawls given 
guideline three of his duty of assistance, which seeks to secure human rights and meet 
basic needs." 
In addition to affirming the pressing claims of sufficiency, Casal relays that the 
reasoning of what matters is whether individuals have enough is often used to deny the 
importance of equality and priority. The negative thesis as argued for by Franfurt holds, 
"if everyone had enough, it would be of no moral consequence whether some had more 
than others".12 Casal makes the case that despite the wide acceptability and compatibility 
with other principles held in seeking to reduce deprivations, what makes a view 
sufficientarian, strictly speaking, is, "not simply the great importance it attaches to 
eliminating deprivation but the lack of importance it attaches to certain additional 
distributive requirements".13 An extreme formulation of the doctrine of sufficiency could 
reveal that, "once an individual is above the threshold, whether she has more or less is not 
important".14 
Rawls, John. "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited", 582. 
See Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 108-111. 
Franfurt, Harry. "Equality as a Moral Ideal", 21. 
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We can see the negative thesis operating to some extent in both Rawls's domestic 
and global theories of justice via his use of the just savings principle. Even though 
Rawls's domestic theory is predominately considered to be egalitarian, such 
considerations are at times constrained by measures of sufficiency. Casal explains that 
Rawls's domestic theory is a type of hybrid model. With that said, domestically the 
difference principle is constrained by the further requirement of just savings. In the 
domestic case the just savings principle places a duty on earlier generations to 
accumulate and conserve enough material resources for future generations. In this 
instance the target for just savings requires that current generations set aside enough 
wealth and resources so that just liberal institutions can be maintained and basic liberties 
can be realized and enjoyed.15 Given this, continued material accumulation is irrelevant 
and this principle, rather expresses a target for and an upper limit on mandatory savings. 
Rawls explains: 
Once just institutions are firmly established and all the basic liberties 
effectively realized, the net accumulation asked for falls to zero. At this 
point a society meets its duty of justice by maintaining just institutions and 
preserving ... a material base sufficient to establish effective just 
institutions within which the basic liberties can all be realized.16 
In both the domestic and international instance great wealth is not necessary. In 
the domestic sphere Rawls holds that "the last stage at which savings is called for is not 
one of great abundance," because "what men want is meaningful work in free association 
with others ... within a framework of just basic institutions".17 Recall that within the 
Society of Peoples the political culture of a society is all-important. Rawls conjectures 
15
 Rawls, John. Theory of Justice, 121, 251 -258, 318, and Political Liberalism, 20, 273-274. 
Rawls, John. Theory of Justice, 255-256. 
1
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that "there is no society anywhere in the world - except for marginal cases - with 
resources so scarce that it could not, were it reasonably and rationally organized and 
governed, become well-ordered".18 The target of assistance is to help a burdened people 
to be able to manage their own affairs and eventually become members in the Society of 
Peoples. Rawls's final aim of assistance is "freedom and equality for the formerly 
burdened societies".19 Given this threshold, a well-ordered society, as described by the 
first guideline for Duty of Assistance, may not necessarily be a wealthy or resource rich 
society.20 The duty of assistance and the duty of just savings express the same underlying 
ideas that: 
(a) The purpose of a just (real) savings principle is to establish 
(reasonably) just basic institutions for a free constitutional democratic 
society (or any well-ordered society) and to secure a social world that 
makes possible a worthwhile life for all its citizens. 
(b) Accordingly, savings may stop once just (or decent) basic 
institutions have been established. 
(c) Great wealth is not necessary to establish just (or decent) 
institutions. How much is needed will depend on a society's particular 
history as well as its conception of justice. Thus the levels of wealth 
among well-ordered peoples will not, in general be the same.21 
Analogously, just savings in the Law of Peoples and in the domestic case aim to realize 
and preserve just (or decent) institutions, provide basic needs, and secure liberties. The 
target of assistance and just savings, as one can conclude, is not to increase wealth or 
further distribute resources past a certain threshold to any society or particular group or 
18
 Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 108. 
' Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 111. 
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individual in a society. Thus, indicating support of the negative thesis that Casal attributes 
to those who support the doctrine of sufficiency. However, a more in depth discussion of 
Rawls's sufficiency, what it demands, and whether this is enough will follow. 
Rawls's Sufficiency 
Casal makes the case that Rawls's conception of justice as fairness reveals a 
plausible hybrid model of sufficiency that additionally and appealingly balances claims 
of equality and priority.22 In his domestic theory, discussed in chapter one of this work, 
Rawls's difference principle operates in conjunction with other supplementary 
requirements. Much like sufficiency principles, Casal points out that, these political 
demands in Rawls's theory reveal satisfiable and non-comparative political objectives. 
One such supplement that operates for Rawls both domestically and globally is his idea 
of a guaranteed social minimum. Recall Rawls's claim that any reasonable conception of 
justice should offer "measures ensuring for all citizens adequate all-purpose means to 
make effective use of their freedoms".23 Let it not be forgotten that Rawls's principles of 
justice apply as a complement to one another, but that "the difference principle is 
subordinate to both the first principle of justice (guaranteeing the equal basic liberties) 
and the principle of fair equality of opportunity".24 By virtue of the principles of basic 
liberty and equality of opportunity taking lexical priority over the difference principle 
undesirable outcomes, such as the exchange of certain rights for the economic advantages 
of the difference principle are avoidable. As Casal points out "the means available to 
protect citizens from absolute deprivation are limited to a lesser degree since the social 
22
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minimum is not subordinate to the basic liberty principle in the same way". The social 
minimum helps to ensure that the basic liberties do not remain merely formal, but rather 
can be effectively employed by every citizen given his or her inclination.26 Casal 
reiterates, "far from being redundant, the social minimum is therefore most useful to 
balance the core values injustice as fairness". 
This balancing of core values that Rawls seeks to attain at the domestic level has 
reverberations again on the global scale. I would argue that given Rawls's initial goal to 
create a theory of global justice that both liberal and decent peoples could reasonably 
agree to in accordance with the facts of reasonable pluralism and pursuit of mutual 
respect among peoples, adopting principles that leave room for considerations of equality, 
priority, and sufficiency reveal a potentially robust account. Recall that the Law of 
Peoples is concerned with justice and stability for the right reasons between liberal and 
decent peoples, living as members of a Society of well-ordered Peoples. Such aims do not 
come without well-considered compromises, thus making a pluralistic view quite 
alluring. However, I would argue that sufficiency seems to be the main operating 
principle at the global level for Rawls given how the Law of Peoples is construed. As to 
whether or not this is an advantage or a detriment to Rawls's position has yet to be 
discussed. 
From here it is important to distinguish precisely the sufficientarian principles 
operating within the Law of Peoples. A critical evaluation of the threshold of the duty of 
assistance and its potential demands will be discussed. Defining the appropriate 
Casal, Paula. "Why Sufficiency is Not Enough", 324. 
Rawls, John. Political Liberalism, 324-331. 
Casal, Paula. "Why Sufficiency is Not Enough", 324. 
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thresholds given Rawls's framework will better reveal whether the duty of assistance 
demands enough contrary to principles of egalitarianism. As a vague starting point, the 
metric of sufficiency concerning Rawls's duty of assistance reveals a commitment to 
assuring that the basic needs of all citizens can be met so that they can take part in the 
political and social life of their given society. In Political Liberalism, Rawls asserts "the 
constitutional essential here is rather that below a certain level of material and social 
well-being, and of training and education, people simply cannot take part in society as 
citizens".28 The difficult question that must be addressed is: how do we define and assign 
these basic needs and what is a sufficient provision to ensure that citizens are able to 
enjoy their society given liberties and take part in civic life? Rawls admits that: 
What determines the level of well-being and education below which this 
happens is not for a political conception to say. One must look to the 
society in question. But that does not mean that the constitutional essential 
is not perfectly clear: it is what is required to give due weight to the idea 
of society as a fair system of cooperation between free and equal citizens, 
and not to regard it, in practice if not in speech, as so much rhetoric.29 
Despite this quotation being taken from Political Liberalism, the ideas expressed within it 
hold significant weight within the Law of Peoples. However, it is important to again 
qualify that the idea of a society as a fair system of cooperation continues to hold at the 
international level, whether this is achieved between free and equal citizens in a liberal 
society or between citizens represented fairly by a consultation hierarchy in a decent 
society is a critical distinction that must be made. Due to this distinction however, at the 
international level, the idea of social cooperation operating necessarily between free and 
equal citizens must be saved in application to liberal peoples only and need not be a 
Rawls, John. Political Liberalism, 166. This quotation in Political Liberalism. 
Rawls, John. Political Liberalism, 166. 
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requirement for the admissibility into the Society of Peoples given Rawls's commitment 
to due toleration, as discussed in chapter one. 
To reiterate, according to Rawls: 
By basic needs I mean roughly those that must be met if citizens are to be 
in a position to take advantage of the rights, liberties, and opportunities of 
their society. These needs include economic means as well as institutional 
rights and freedoms. 
From this it is understandable that the fulfilment of basic needs reveals some sort of an 
adequate social minimum. The provision of basic needs takes priority and occurs prior to 
the enactment of rights and liberties. Basic needs are to be met partly as a matter of 
human rights. At a minimum, a person's basic needs are provisions that enable him or her 
to effectively exercise the rights and liberties granted within his or her given society. As 
mentioned briefly before basic needs are not, meagrely speaking simply needs of 
subsistence such as shelter, clean drinking water, food, and clothing. Robustly so, 'basic 
needs' on Rawls's account expresses what is needed for individuals to both understand 
and fruitfully express their rights and liberties, and utilize the means that would allow an 
individual to pursue a rational life plan of his or her choosing.30 However vague basic 
needs and the metric of sufficiently meeting them may appear at this time, one cannot 
overlook the potential robust demands that may be hiding behind this unclear definition. 
Recall that for Rawls, "the sensible and rational exercise of all liberties, of whatever kind, 
as well as the intelligent use of property, always implies having general all-purpose 
economic means".31 
Although Rawls's basic needs required by the Law of Peoples do not express a 
Rawls, John. See Theory of Justice, regarding social and primary goods, §15:78-81 and §63:358-365. 
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full liberal conception of a person, where citizens of the globe are to be regarded as free 
and equal, with equal basic rights and equal basic liberties, they do express "a special 
class of urgent rights" whose violation is "equally condemned by both reasonable liberal 
peoples and decent hierarchical peoples".32 Despite appearing quite short Rawls's list of 
human rights required by the Law of Peoples includes: 
Among the human rights are the right to life (to means of subsistence and 
security); to liberty (to freedom from slavery, serfdom, and forced 
occupation, and to a sufficient measure of liberty of conscience to ensure 
freedom of religion and thought); and to formal equality as expressed by 
the rules of natural justice (that is, that similar cases be treated similarly).33 
It is important to take careful note that Rawls only requires a sufficient measure of liberty 
of conscience. The Law of Peoples requires that decent peoples make room for or permit 
liberty of conscience, though it need not necessarily be an equal liberty. As a qualification 
Rawls stipulates that "liberty of conscience may not be as extensive nor as equal for all 
members of society: for instance, one religion may legally predominate in the state 
government, while other religions, though tolerated, may be denied the right to hold 
certain positions".34 Thus, these human rights and basic needs that allow for their 
realization are not peculiarly liberal, and; therefore not politically parochial. 
In addition to Rawls's basic needs and minimal rights being acceptable to both 
decent and liberal peoples it is significant to understand that provisions of basic needs 
and human rights coincide with Rawls's notion of a common good idea of justice and 
with what he asserts is necessary for obtaining fair methods of social cooperation. 
Attaching a certain level of significance to Rawls's vague notions of what he identifies as 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 79. 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 65. 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 65 fn.2. 
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a common good idea of justice and social cooperation and understanding how these two 
ideas shape what Rawls comes to regard as basic needs strengthens the possible 
robustness and sufficiency of what his basic needs may entail in the Law of Peoples. 
Freeman points out that "common good conceptions, by definition promote a conception 
of the good of each member of society". 6 They are typically defined in a liberal society 
by a liberal conception of justice and by decent hierarchical peoples by some nonliberal 
moral conception. In both instances it is the use of public reason that helps define and 
inform such conceptions. For Rawls, it is important to realize that what he considers to be 
a common good idea of justice is purposely vague, given that it is supposed to be 
determined by each society, its political culture, moral traditions, religious and 
philosophical doctrines, and such. 
The connections between a common good idea of justice, social cooperation, 
basic needs, and human rights may not be so obvious at this time. This is certainly the 
case given that basic international needs do not express a liberal conception of a person 
who is to be considered free and equal. However minimal, on Rawls's account persons 
will be regarded as individuals who are responsible and cooperating members of groups 
within a society acting in accordance with their moral duties and obligations as members 
of these groups. Rawls argues that any common good idea of justice would stipulate that 
it is necessary for individuals to be ruled by law and not by force. Fidelity to the rule of 
law identifies a potentially robust demand in terms of minimal basic needs. Rawls argues 
that to be able to enjoy the rights afforded to a person within his or her group and society 
35
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a basic need to be governed by law and not a system of force and coercion is essential 
under the Law of Peoples. Law is to be guided by this common good idea of justice both 
in liberal and decent societies. Law is not to be used as some instrumental tool of politics 
or the ruling elite among members of the Society of Peoples. Rawls asserts that is would 
not be reasonable, rational, nor in accordance with the common good idea of justice to 
have a law assign human rights and systematically violate them. "What have come to be 
called human rights are recognized as necessary conditions of any system of social 
cooperation. When they are regularly violated, we have command by force, a slave 
system, and no cooperation of any kind". In support of this idea Freeman argues that, 
"these conditions virtually guarantee that apartheid, ethnic cleansing, and other egregious 
T O 
forms of discrimination will not be practised in well-ordered decent societies". Justice 
is to take into account the fundamental interests of everyone and consider the demands of 
each special class of groups in a given society. As we have come to understand for Rawls, 
basic needs reflect provisions that secure a social world that makes possible a worthwhile 
life for all its citizens.39 This requires providing a just, but not necessarily equal, basic 
structure. 
In summation, basic needs reflect having sufficient all-purpose means for 
individuals to make intelligent and effective use of their freedoms and to lead reasonable 
and worthwhile liyes.40 Basic needs push the threshold beyond what is needed so that 
people do not starve or perish from disease. Instead basic needs identify the provisions 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 68. 
Freeman, Samuel. "The Law of Peoples, Social Cooperation, Human Rights, and Distributive Justice", 
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required to enable citizens to enjoy their liberties. Freeman explains that the duty of 
assistance suggests "a duty to provide in some way for the educational needs of a 
burdened people, so that they can find employment and be economically self-sufficient, 
and can actively participate in the life of their culture".41 However, Rawls says too little 
in respect to clearly defining these sorts of demands. Human rights and basic needs serve 
an additional purpose in Rawls's Law of Peoples, however. They express a class of urgent 
rights, that when said rights are violated, both reasonable liberal and decent hierarchical 
peoples equally condemn the violators. Rights are used to demarcate toleration in the 
Society of Peoples. They restrict the justifying reasons for war and its conduct and 
specify limits to a regime's internal political autonomy. Rawls holds that "human rights 
set a necessary, though not sufficient standard for the decency of domestic and political 
social institutions".42 
Beitz explains that "the relative austerity of Rawls's list reflects the role that 
human rights are to play in the political life of the Society of Peoples. Respect for human 
rights is, so to speak, part of the price of admission to international society and defines 
the threshold of toleration by liberal and decent peoples."43 Basic needs and this special 
class of urgent rights demarcate the boundaries of acceptable pluralism within the Society 
of Peoples. They help to inform the foreign policies of liberal peoples and explain why a 
violation would warrant intervention to bring about reform. Recall that the Law of 
Peoples seeks to create international stability for the right reasons. When peoples fail to 
provide basic needs and when human rights are violated, reform and intervention are not 
Freeman, Samuel. "The Law of Peoples, Social Cooperation, Human Rights, and Distributive Justice", 
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merely justified by the individual good they bring about, but also by considerations of 
international stability. Rawls holds that outlaw states that violate human rights deeply 
affect the international climate of power and violence and need not be tolerated. 
To further my argument I look to the work of David Miller. Miller assumes that 
only certain rights-violations are urgent enough to trigger remedial responsibilities in 
outsiders, such as being denied means of subsistence.45 Other claims, such as, the equal 
right to participation in politics do not. Rawls's list of basic needs and human rights 
develops quite similarly to this. 
It follows then that a compelling feature of Rawls's list of human rights is that 
they are neither overtly paternalist nor parochial,46 and that all liberal and decent people 
can agree to them on the basis of their liberal and decent comprehensive views. Although 
his list of human rights may not appear as demanding or exhaustive as others require, 
they embody a minimal acceptability that a reasonable people could uphold, in that they 
do not impose a particular comprehensive conceptions of'the good'. On this standard of 
acceptability, then Rawls's list appears short, but is consistent with his aim of providing a 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 81. 
Miller identifies remedial responsibilities as: "the responsibility we may have to come to the aid of 
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Law of Peoples to which all well-ordered peoples could agree. Thus, it could be said that 
in addition to providing a target for aid, and despite valuing human rights for their own 
sake, the minimum standard of meeting basic needs also identifies conditions that peoples 
must meet if they are to enjoy standards of sovereignty and self-determination. The 
identification of basic needs, thus upholds Rawls's liberal values of reasonable pluralism, 
toleration, and mutual respect. Additionally, assigning basic needs so that they can be 
accepted cross-culturally and that their meaning can be sustained over time further adds 
to my argument that the duty of assistance is a robust and sufficient demand within 
Rawls's Society of Peoples. 
Even though cosmopolitans, such as Tan, argue that it is inconsistent for Rawls to 
make such minimal demands and not push for a principle of global distribution, similar to 
the difference principle, in order to achieve equality for individuals; I argue that to remain 
consistent with his commitments to pluralism, respect of self-governance, and self-
determination, Rawls is justified to define basic needs as such. Although at a first glance 
it appears that Rawls's has given very little justification for what his critics claim to be a 
truncated list of human rights, when we look toward the larger theoretical commitments 
threaded throughout Rawls's work it is possible to string together a tighter web of 
justification in regards to basic needs. 
At this point in my Thesis, I am prepared to admit that this justification may leave 
us wanting. I recognize that two points must be distinguished and made clearer. The first 
point being the clarification of basic needs and second, the entailment of this distinction: 
being that a duty of assistance that secures basic needs is robust, and reasonably 
sufficient, and that we need not push much further, as suggested by Tan. 
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The Role of Basic Needs and International Political Human Rights 
To further contribute to the clarification of basic needs and the meaning of human 
rights on Rawls's account a discussion of the role that both basic needs and human rights 
play is necessary to ground our understanding. Normatively speaking, general meaning is 
enriched when a functional role of association can be assigned to the subject in question. 
Here, if we can better identify the role Rawls intends for the assignment of basic needs 
and his provisions of human rights under the Law of Peoples, on some relational level, 
the meaning Rawls assigns to such conceptions should appear much clearer. I hold that 
basic needs and human rights on Rawls's account express three main roles in the Law of 
Peoples; 1) measures for toleration, 2) assignment of a duty to aid, and 3) provision of 
what is necessary for social cooperation (already discussed). The first two of these roles 
will be discussed in more detail below. 
Distinguishing Which Needs are Basic Needs 
To help better distinguish what is to be considered a basic need in justifying a list 
of human rights, the humanitarian approach discussed by David Miller should provide us 
with some much needed considerations lacking in the Law of Peoples. Miller explains 
that "according to the needs approach, we prove that something is a human right by 
showing that having that right fulfils the needs of the right-holder".48 Basic needs when 
used to justify human rights must express a person's 'intrinsic' needs, identifying those 
items (food and shelter) or conditions (various freedoms) necessary for a person to avoid 
harm and to lead a minimally decent life. Such claims as to what counts as a basic need 
when used to justify human rights are to be acceptable universally, and in Rawls's case 
Miller, David. National Responsibility and GlobalJustice, 179. 
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must appear reasonable to liberal and decent peoples. 
With that said, in determining basic needs by the avoidance of harm and the 
promotion of meeting the threshold of a minimally decent life it is important to determine 
what is to count as harm and set the minimum for decency. Quite easily we can identify 
harms derived from not having our physical or biological needs met. Typically, a person 
suffers harm when he or she is deprived adequate amounts of food, clean water, shelter, 
clothing, bears uncontrollable pain, contracts preventable and curable diseases that go 
untreated, and who's life is lost to a premature death. However, in addition to our 
biological needs, it is recognizable, and much a part of Rawls's Law of Peoples to give 
due weight and consideration to human beings as biological and social creatures. 
Additional harms that humans may suffer may arise when individuals are denied 
the conditions of social existence. Miller explains "a person is harmed when she is unable 
to live a minimally decent life in the society to which she belongs".49 As highlighted by 
Rawls's Law of Peoples an individual's identity, social existence and self worth is largely 
tied to the groups they belong to, the culture and history they share, and common 
traditions and language(s). Rawls stipulates that political culture is all-important. Given 
this, the idea of a minimally decent life illuminates needs that address individuals both as 
biological and social entities. Where an individual's well-being is concerned then, 
fostering a sense of belonging within a community, having a sense of community support, 
and attaining community acceptance, identifies a basic need that would enable an 
individual to be able to use the liberties and freedoms granted within a lived community. 
With the recognition that persons tend to view their lives through the lens of a 
Miller, David. National Responsibility and Global Justice, 181. 
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community, having an account of basic needs and human rights that adequately addresses 
issues of exclusion, persecution, and public shaming, in addition to relief for harms such 
as malnutrition, provides a list that is cross-culturally acceptable, robust and most likely 
reasonably sufficient. 
If we are to define basic needs by reference to what is necessary to lead a decent 
human life and to enable citizens to make effective use of their rights and liberties of their 
society, then it is imperative to determine what is actually necessary to achieve such 
thresholds in different cultural contexts. Miller appeals to the commonly shared activities 
that humans engage in cross-culturally to ground claims of what a minimally decent life 
would require. He refers to these common activities as core human activities. Such core 
activities shared cross-culturally include examples of work, play, leisure, learning, child-
rearing/engaging in family relations, an appreciation for and engagement in the arts (from 
storytelling/folklore, to music, carving/sculpture, dance). On this account of what 
constitutes a minimally decent life, one's life expectations will include engaging in each 
of the core activities so chosen. Miller explains given the conditions of one's society, an 
individual should be able to work and play without having to bear unreasonable costs or 
forgo some other core activity.51 Basic needs, by reference to minimal decency express 
the baseline conditions that everyone should reach irrespective of attaining higher forms 
of flourishing or privilege. Those living just at this threshold would lead a fairly standard 
life, and Miller conjectures that such a life would be quite dull. However having just 
enough, nonetheless, is invaluable in that those just at the baseline would no longer suffer 
from degradation, social exclusion, worthlessness, and any innumerable insecurities 
50
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compared to those who fall below. This attachment to minimal decency, having enough to 
enjoy one's rights and liberties, and engage in the social and cultural life of one's society 
is a robust conception of basic needs that offers a sufficient grounding for human rights 
contrary to what the cosmopolitans may demand. There are other groundings for Rawls's 
list of human rights however, that must be explored to fully capture the potential demands 
of his duty of assistance. 
Basic Needs and Human Rights as Measures for Toleration 
In the case of the Law of Peoples, Rawls utilizes human rights and basic needs to 
demarcate the tolerable from intolerable, or in Rawls's words the outlaw from the decent, 
the burdened from the well-ordered. Human rights set a necessary, though not sufficient 
condition of political legitimacy, where human rights identify conditions that peoples are 
to meet if they are to enjoy standard rights of sovereignty and self-determination within 
the Society of Peoples. When human rights are assigned the role of determining 
intervention and what is intolerable, they express what Rawls identifies as "a special class 
of urgent rights" whose violation is "equally condemned by both reasonable liberal 
peoples and decent hierarchical peoples".5 David Miller explains that on the standard of 
intervention a list of human rights is to be short and express essential rights. Essential 
rights should reflect minimal considerations such as the right to life and physical 
security.53 
As discussed briefly above, for Rawls an account of the justification of human 
rights should therefore explain why a violation would warrant intervention to bring about 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 79. 
Miller, David. National Responsibility and Global Justice, 166. 
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reform. In his article "Are Human Rights Mainly Implemented by Intervention?" James 
Nickel explains that Rawls's list of human rights privileges roles related to intervention. 
Nickel argues that assigning such a role to human rights in the Law of Peoples is arbitrary 
and undefended. Nickel explains that Rawls mentions only three (out of many) possible 
political roles of human rights54: 
1. Standards for international criticism and diplomatic action by 
governments and organizations 
2. Standards for recommending economic sanctions by international 
organizations and for imposing them by governments 
3. Standards for military intervention by international organizations or 
governments 
Rawls's narrow focus on the boundaries of international toleration and permissible 
intervention, Nickel argues, is limiting when human rights get tied to justifying foreign 
policy and to the permissible use of coercion and force in international relations. Nickel 
holds that there is more to human rights law than dealing with just gross violations. With 
no intention of undermining the importance of dealing with egregious and severe 
violations such a genocide and slavery, Nickel asserts that there is more to be considered 
beyond such gross violations. Nickel claims that Rawls's view suggests that this is all 
there is to human rights law.56 He asserts that it is a flawed move "to follow Rawls in 
treating human rights as if their main political role is to specify when it is permissible for 
countries to use intervention to deal with grave violations".57 On this view, Rawls takes 
one important role that human rights serves and makes it central without considering 
other definitions of the role of political human rights. Nickel explains: 
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As human rights function today within international organizations, it is 
just untrue to say that they are mainly about intervention. A better 
description of their main role is that they encourage and pressure 
governments to treat their citizens humanely with respect for their lives, 
liberties, and equal citizenship. They use social pressure and acculturation 
to promote acceptance and compliance with human rights norms.58 
Furthermore, Nickel distinguishes that the 'outlaw' versus 'decent' method of 
contrast in weighting toleration creates a false dichotomy in Rawls's theory that does not 
fully capture the multi-functional role that human rights should play internationally. 
Instead, Nickel suggests that transforming Rawls's aligned dichotomies between outlaw 
and decent peoples worthy of toleration, he proposes an aligned trichotomy where 
delinquent peoples are also included in considerations of foreign policy.59 A delinquent 
people, on Nickel's account, expresses many of the characteristics of a decent well-
ordered people, but falls short in some aspects of being reasonably decent; however, such 
violations are not severe enough to warrant military intervention. To clarify, a delinquent 
people perhaps respects many of the essential or urgent human rights required by Rawls's 
Law of Peoples, but may non-egregiously violate or suppress others. For instance, a 
newly industrializing country may adopt very sound labour practises for its workers, the 
workers may be backed by a very strong union who may have a large share in the means 
of production, yet such a state may not hold very strong environmental policies in terms 
of resource protection and emission standards respecting the rights of future generations. 
Rather, Nickel offers, and I would argue helpfully so, that perhaps including 
multi-levels of acceptability and toleration to the Law of Peoples would better express the 
realistic Utopia that Rawls has intended to construct. I hold that convincingly, Nickel 
See Nickel, James. "Are Human Rights Mainly Implemented by Intervention?", 271. 
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makes the case that international acceptability and criticism may not necessarily be 
mutually exclusive. The accusation that Rawls presents us with a false dilemma, between 
decent and outlaw peoples, draws our attention to a potential deficit in Rawls's theory of 
human rights. As there may be instances worthy of consideration where a people may be 
able to respect and admire another people in most areas, but in other matters may think 
certain behaviour is offensive; however not completely unacceptable so as to require 
military action.60 In these instances military intervention may be ill measured and 
inappropriate; however, international criticism may still be required by concerns of 
justice and mutual concern for public good and well-being. 
Perhaps Rawls's distinction between what is tolerable and permissible is too cut 
and dry as there may just be a double edge sword swinging between gradients of 
acceptability and fierce criticisms. In questioning whether the role Rawls assigns to 
human rights is too narrow and the threshold for toleration too strict, when we relax these 
standards, it is reasonable to accept that expressions of criticism and disagreement are not 
always incompatible with tolerance. There is a notable tension between respect for due 
toleration and intervention in Rawls's theory that leaves out many weighty considerations 
and useful means of criticism and resolution beyond penetrating another's borders 
through military might, coercion, political sanctions, and the like. Nickel points to the use 
of political "jawboning" as an effective means to express international criticism and 
condemnation.61 Jawboning as a dialectical tool, according to Nickel, is a useful means of 
expression where governments or politically motivated lobby groups, and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), can criticize, shame, and attempt to persuade 
60
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delinquent peoples to move to conditions of acceptability through non-coercive measures. 
Most likely, outlaw peoples will not be motivated or open to such criticisms; however in 
recognizing that there may exist peoples that are not quite decent, not quite burdened, and 
not quite an outlaw state, tools of international dialogue, such as jawboning, would make 
useful additions to Rawls's account of the duty of assistance when seeking to evaluate its 
potential robustness. If we can come to recognize that assistance should take on many 
measures beyond dispensing of aid or military intervention, and may include discussions 
as to what is acceptable and condoned by the Law of Peoples in order to motivate a 
people toward becoming decent, if not liberal, than the practise of jawboning seems valid. 
Given that it appears unclear in Rawls's Law of Peoples as to whether a society that 
publicly criticizes another is being intolerant and disrespectful of the bounds of 
sovereignty, I hold that we can make space for such means of international discussion. In 
addition to this I conjecture that Rawls's adherence to respect for public reason, his use of 
overlapping consensus, and value of public discourse that contribute to reasonable 
pluralism, leads me to assert that jawboning would be an acceptable and worthwhile tool 
used to reaffirm what is to count as satisfying the measures of public reason and further 
contribute to the meaning of what is considered the public good. 
Here we are concerned about the relation between public criticism and 
intolerance. Rawls does make the case that from behind the vejl of ignorance, both liberal 
and decent peoples, in negotiating the terms of the society of peoples, have strong reasons 
to insist upon the right of their governments and politicians to freedom of expression 
about the domestic and international policies of other peoples. Recall, peoples are to be 
equally considered mutually free and equal members in the society of peoples, who may 
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require other peoples to justify their reasons of action, and in return must provide their 
own reason of pursuing such aims. To ensure that the fundamental interests of liberal or 
decent peoples are preserved and their basic political institutions sustained it seems 
reasonable that from the original position peoples would insist on the right of their 
politicians and governments to express their views about the folly or wrongfulness of the 
practises of other countries in the areas of foreign relations, human rights, economic 
policy, international law, trade, and the environment that threaten their own institutions, 
culture, and practises. Tolerance does not require liberal peoples, and their governments, 
to refrain from public criticism of other peoples in these varied areas. This is especially 
the case when from behind the veil of ignorance a people cannot possibly know whether 
their neighbour will be a fellow liberal, decent, delinquent, burdened, or outlaw regime. 
Instability at a shared border where there is a potential for a large influx of refugees 
seeking asylum that may strain a stable people's resources, for example, speaks to making 
space for the treatment of human rights violations in a variety of ways from the extreme 
end of military intervention toward gentler means of jawboning discussed. If Rawls is 
committed to pursing stability for the right reasons, a multi-levelled approach to dealing 
with human rights violations in his Society of Peoples may better serve his ambitions. 
In addition to jawboning, the use of official political protest may be another 
adequate means of expressing distaste or displeasure with a people, while not going as far 
as being intolerant to their sovereignty. Nickel explains "the purpose of a protest is to 
give notice of nonacquiescence in a practice so as to prevent or make more difficult the 
development of a customary norm".62 Official protests play a significant role in the 
Nickel, James. "Are Human Rights Mainly Implemented by Intervention?", 273. 
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evolution of customary international law, holds Nickel, as in the absence of an 
international objection or protest an acceptance or a customary liberty right in regards to 
that practise may be understood. The right to protest secures a valid and valuable form of 
expression both domestically and internationally and a deprivation of such expression 
jeopardizes the validity and protection of international legal rights. It is not 
unreasonable to view criticism as constructive in the international case. Disagreement 
does not necessarily entail a sentiment of intolerance. Rawls's attachment to reasonable 
pluralism is built on the assumption that there will be disagreements, and some of which 
are to be decided behind the veil of ignorance. Yet, I hold that beyond the veil of 
ignorance, how we shall come to recognize the threshold for what is acceptable and 
tolerable should be informed by such modes of communication, jawboning and peaceful 
political protest that is. 
Again I highlight that Rawls's list of human rights are drawn up for the ideal case, 
in the Society of Peoples. They are the measures used to grant membership and toleration 
into the Society of Peoples. When Rawls's role of human rights is combined with the 
stipulation that basic needs are to be met, as an a priori requirement to them, that would 
afford one the capabilities to effectively utilize the liberties and freedoms of his or her 
society - it appears that Rawls's focus on toleration does not make his list as meagre as 
Nickel claims. Rather, I assert that although other human rights roles may not be argued 
for explicitly or as fully as the measure of toleration in Rawls's formulation of human 
rights that are to be governed by the Law of Peoples, I argue that additional roles may be 
implied and acceptable within the Society of Peoples. As suggested by Nickel, when we 
Nickel, James. "Are Human Rights Mainly Implemented by Intervention?", 273. 
93 
look toward what toleration requires, perhaps we can find space to expand Rawls's list of 
human rights worthy of international consideration to a more robust list. From here I will 
continue to consider another role that human rights play on Rawls's account in our 
evaluation of the robustness and sufficiency of his duty of assistance. I will briefly look 
toward Rawls's use of human rights in his assignment of a duty to aid, as we have already 
explored and will continue to explore the use of human rights in their contribution toward 
social cooperation. 
Human Rights as Signifying a Duty to Aid 
In addition to serving the role of demarcating what is tolerable, basic needs and 
basic human rights on Rawls's account aim to identify a list of rights that can specify a 
global minimum that individuals worldwide are entitled to as a matter of justice. This 
special class of urgent rights can impose obligations on peoples both domestically, 
serving as a constraint on their sovereignty, and internationally where duties are required 
of well-off peoples to aid those who are burdened by unfortunate circumstances. Rawls's 
duty of assistance highlights that when basic needs are not met, the human rights that 
they support trigger the enactment of a duty to aid in the Society of Peoples. Unlike many 
views of moral minimalism, Rawls's minimalism fulfils claims of both negative 
obligations and positive obligations in the consideration of the role of human rights. Most 
minimal conceptions typically cover negative injunctions prohibiting murder, bodily 
interference, rape, torture, oppression, and tyranny; however, Rawls's list extends to cases 
in which the protection of human rights requires positive action on the part of other 
peoples. 
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Rawls's Omissions: Can We Be Justified to Require More? 
It is notable that Rawls purposefully omits several rights identified by the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Among the omitted are significantly 
freedom of expression and association, and the rights of democratic political 
participation. For Rawls these are distinctly liberal rights and presuppose specific 
institutions. However, I am willing to argue that although not explicitly stated within 
Rawls's short list of urgent human rights, there is room for sufficient inclusion of these 
additional rights under the Law of Peoples. Using Rawls's own reasoning for the 
inclusion of a sufficient measure of liberty of conscience that ensures freedom of religion 
and thought, I assert that we too could reasonably include measures of freedom of 
expression and association as well as certain means for political participation while still 
managing to avoid Rawls's worry of parochialism. 
It appears somewhat arbitrary for Rawls to omit completely the right to freedom 
of expression and association. He does include some necessary, although relatively 
undefined, measures for political representation and participation among decent 
hierarchical peoples. We will set this matter aside for the time being and focus on why it 
may be possible and necessary to include some minimal threshold for freedom of 
expression and association analogous to a sufficient measure of freedom of conscience. 
As discussed above, Rawls, as a basic need requires that basic institutions be structured 
so as to reflect a common good conception of justice. In addition to this citizens are to be 
governed by the rule of law that best reflects this common good conception of justice 
within the given society. This common good idea of justice is publicly accepted and 
provides the acceptable and fair means for social cooperation. Given that we accept such 
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demands for basic needs I would further argue that the inclusion of some sufficient 
measure of liberty of expression and association would follow from the identification of 
said need. For if decent well-ordered hierarchical peoples are required by the Law of 
Peoples to grant recognition and toleration toward other minority groups, Rawls uses the 
example of predominate versus minority religious groups, thus, "permitting liberty of 
conscience, though not an equal liberty"64 could it possibly be permissible to also grant 
liberty of expression and association, though not an equal liberty? In my opinion this is 
not only possible on Rawls's account, but may actually be necessary thus further 
supporting my overall argument that Rawls's basic needs and human rights are more 
robust then they initially appear. 
Much of my reasoning for supporting such a claim stems from Rawls's publicity 
condition spelled out in Political Liberalism!'5 When we attach the appropriate 
significance to Rawls's notion of public reason and how this is to guide a well-ordered 
society's common understanding of justice and right and that citizens hold a basic right to 
have their institutions and laws shaped by such reasoning, it follows that at least some 
minimal amount of freedom of expression and association would be both acceptable and 
required.66 In order to honour human rights, Rawls asserts that decent hierarchical 
peoples' basic structures must give a substantial role to its members in political 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 62 fn 2. 
Rawls, John. Political Liberalism, §4: 66-72. 
On some prima facie level, 1 acknowledge that a minimal amount or sufficient amount or constrained 
amount, if you will, of freedom of expression and association seems like a contradiction in terms. 
However, 1 think that this need not be the case. Historically speaking in terms of the development of 
human rights and liberties it is not uncommon to restrict or constrain some rights and liberties when 
they conflict so as to make room for the realization of other more pressing types of liberties. We can see 
such reasoning in operation with Rawls's difference principle in his domestic theory where some level 
of the attainment of economic wealth may be restricted to make more space for the freedom of 
opportunity. At other times we may see the limitation put on freedom of speech, when instances of hate 
speech further contribute to ignorance, oppression, and the silencing of a plurality of reasonable voices. 
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decisions. This relays a basic need to have the political means and forum to have one or 
one's group concerns expressed. So although the right to hold higher political or judicial 
offices, in a decent hierarchical society such as Rawls's Kazanistan may be restricted, 
"other religions and associations are encouraged to have a flourishing cultural life of their 
own and to take part in the civic culture of the wider society".68 This signifies some 
minimal requirement to make room for a plurality of voices and opinions, which at times 
may be voices of dissent. If we can accept that there ought be toleration for other 
religious and minority groups, and that they are to be afforded a substantial role in 
political decision making and civic culture, then it shall be the case that they are to be 
permitted some sufficient level of reasonable liberty of expression and association. 
Expression in this instance need not be completely unbridled, so as to disrupt fair social 
cooperation and undermine the prevailing political and social values inherent in the given 
society. For example a people such as Kazanistan may permit a free press, but at the same 
time hold that images portraying the Prophet Muhammad are impermissible to print as 
this type of expression would greatly offend and challenge deeply rooted values within 
the given society. 
To further determine what types of expression and association that may be 
permissible, if not necessary it is important to determine the types of expression that I 
have in mind. Mostly I would like to make space for types of expression that would allow 
for or create the appropriate channels of social progress within a given society. If a 
people's laws and basic structure of public institutions are to be guided by public reason 
and a common conception of justice, it seems necessary that individuals and the groups 
67
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they represent be afforded the appropriate means of public discussion to actualize their 
substantive role in political decision-making. Such channels could include and need not 
be limited to policy making based on deliberative democratic decision making69, holding 
forums for public debate, and allowing for peaceful demonstrations and protests. The 
types of reasonable expression that may be permissible should reflect avenues required to 
maintain a just society and a healthy civic life. Furthermore, such expressions and 
associations are to act as a reference point or a compass for what is embodied by a 
people's common conception of justice. 
Further, I conjecture that permitting certain sufficient types of expression and 
association better contributes to social cooperation and social progress, rather than 
causing mere disruption. Making room for social movements and social progress derived 
from public debate, peaceful protest, awareness campaigns, and discursive decision-
making would perhaps ensure smoother transitions of change. Violent revolts and riots 
stemming from outright oppression would be less likely if citizens and non-governmental 
organizations were given the ability to vocalize their views through the channels of 
dissent mentioned. I think it is fair to argue that providing space for peaceful protest, non-
violent resistance, and quiet revolutions rather than a violent coup d'etat coincides and 
supports Rawls's idea of stability for the right reasons among peoples and within an 
individual society. 
In addition to this, recall that the final hope of the Law of Peoples is that it will 
provide adequate means and motivation for decent peoples to move toward becoming 
liberal should they so decide on their own. If a people are to make an autonomous 
Briefly, deliberative democracy reveals a process where legitimate lawmaking arises through public 
deliberation by the people. 
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decision to become liberal in addition to having the political will to do so they must have 
the proper instrumental and institutional practises and procedures in place as well. 
Having the ability to express such a political desire, to move toward becoming liberal one 
could say is an instrumental need in this instance. If we want to earnestly accept that it is 
the desire of the Law of Peoples to provide the necessary means that would enable a 
society to progress to becoming a liberal people, it would follow that they must have 
some minimal liberty of expression, association, and ability to participate politically to do 
so. Hence, my argumentation for the inclusion of such rights, however, minimal to the 
Law of Peoples. 
Much criticism has been voiced regarding Rawls's truncated list of human rights. 
Concerns that he does not adequately account for future generations, the plight of 
women, and the world's worst off have been raised. Egalitarians complain that factors 
such as birthplace, whether one is born into an industrial or resource rich society with 
sound population policies versus being born into a society with little population control 
that relies on traditional agrarian practises, has not been mitigated in the Society of 
Peoples. However, I assert that with the inclusion of a sufficient amount of freedom of 
expression, association, and political participation, combined with avenues of education 
and advancement provided by the duty of assistance, both the political will and ability to 
make change and strive for social progress within one's society seems very possible. 
A Women's Place in Rawls's Society of Peoples 
Given the pervasiveness of patriarchy displayed in our current global context, it is 
perhaps very hard to conceive of a realistic Utopia that does not push for individual 
equality, but merely equality between peoples, as an account that can deal adequately 
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with the plight of women. However, to be considered a good standing member in the 
Society of Peoples a society must uphold equal justice for its women. This is a 
requirement on Rawls's account in determining whether a people is to be considered 
decent and well-ordered.70 However, how equal justice of women is realized and 
understood by a given society is what may set it apart, stipulates Rawls. For example, 
Rawls demonstrates that a society may hold equal justice for women, yet because of its 
prevailing religious and social values, freely held by its women, it may not reduce the 
rate of population.71 Granted that Rawls's list of human rights includes a sufficient 
amount of liberty of conscience to ensure freedom of religion and thought, he assumes 
that the basic elements of equal justice for women are in place. From this he concludes, 
"that the rate of population growth of a given society is voluntary, meaning that women 
are not coerced by their religion or their place in the social structure".731 assert that such 
an assumption and conclusion are quite controversial and that Rawls does not give 
sufficient reason to be so confident in providing the basic elements of equal justice for 
women within the Society of Peoples. 
Rawls's Law of Peoples does not support formal Equality; however, there is a 
stipulation that similar cases be treated similarly, but this is simply a meagre measure of 
consistency in accordance with natural law. That said, there are requirements in regards to 
minimal representation that are to be upheld in order for a people to qualify as decent. 
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Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 118. 
72
 Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 65. 
73
 Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 118fn52. However, Rawls's position assumes quite a lot about the 
power and pervasiveness of indoctrination. It also appears to overlook the difficulty of traditional social 
pressures that individuals face within their given societies. As Martha Nussbaum has argued, "traditions 
of modesty and purity have often relegated women to such substandard lives". Nussbaum, Martha. 
Women and Human Development, 42. 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 65. 
100 
However minimal, when representation of women or a minority group is administered by 
a consultation hierarchy Rawls holds that: 
One step to ensure that their claims are appropriately taken into account 
may be to arrange that a majority of the members of the bodies 
representing the (previously) oppressed be chosen from among those 
whose rights have been violated. As we have seen, one condition of a 
decent hierarchical society is that its legal system and social order do not 
violate human rights. The procedure of consultation must be arranged to 
stop all such violations.75 
It follows then, within the Law of Peoples, any group representing women's fundamental 
interests must include a majority of women.76 Given that all well-ordered societies affirm 
human rights, it follows that any conditions of the consultation procedure that are 
necessary to prevent violations of the human rights of women are to be adopted. Again, 
this is not a peculiarly liberal idea but one that is also common to all decent peoples. It 
appears that there is some room for the emancipation of women within the Society of 
Peoples if indeed a woman's position of equality is cross-culturally acceptable. The case 
can be made then, that a duty of assistance which aims at securing the status of women is 
sufficiently sensitive without being subject to the charge of improperly undermining a 
society's religion and culture. The principle here is similar to one that is always followed 
in regards to the claims of religion. Rawls explains that: 
A religion cannot claim as a justification that its intolerance of other 
religions is necessary for it to maintain itself. In the same way a religion 
cannot claim as a justification for its subjection of women that it is 
necessary for its survival. Basic human rights are involved, and these 
belong to the common institutions and practises of all liberal and decent 
societies.77 
To further support the idea that there is perhaps adequate space to secure the rights of 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 75. 
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Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 111. 
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women, and most likely other minorities, it is important to bring fourth an idea expressed 
in Political Liberalism, that stipulates that any reasonable political conception must 
impose restrictions on other permissible comprehensive views.78 It is not unreasonable, 
given Rawls's use of overlapping consensus and sense of what public reason entails, to 
encourage some ways of life, discourage others, and exclude some all together. "The 
encouraging or discouraging of comprehensive doctrines comes about for at least two 
reasons: their associated ways of life may be indirect conflict with the principles of 
justice; or else they may be admissible but fail to gain adherents under the political and 
social conditions of a just constitutional regime".79 Thus, it would follow that one society 
could not claim decency if half of the population, its female population, was subject to 
oppression and degradation. Taking women's rights seriously is a threshold for decency 
and inclusion into the society of peoples, but what is of contention is how such rights are 
to be realized and their equalities enacted. 
Within the Society of Peoples Rawls holds that the most effective and acceptable 
way to institute family planning and stabilize population rates is to establish the elements 
of equal justice for women.80 When evaluating how well a people will fare or in the 
estimation of how best to aid a burdened people Rawls acknowledges that a decisive 
factor, in addition to having well-ordered institutions, appears to be the status of women. 
As previously discussed, taking human rights seriously is the price for admission into the 
Society of Peoples, and in addition to valuing these rights for their own sake, Rawls 
estimates that respect for human rights could also relieve population pressures given the 
Rawls, John. Political Liberalism, V: §6. 
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educational role that human rights serve as "certain kinds of advice may be helpful, and 
burdened societies would do well to pay particular attention to the fundamental interests 
of women".811 assert, however, that Rawls, in addition to including a sufficient measure 
of liberty of conscience (as accounted for on his list), restricted measures of freedom of 
expression and association (as supported in my previous section), must also take 
seriously the right to bodily security and non-interference. At a first glance such a right to 
preserve one's bodily integrity seems quite obvious, but the entailments from the 
recognition of such a right holds great importance for women in particular, but 
additionally for those finding themselves in positions of vulnerability. 
Incorporating sufficient space to account for a woman's embodiment in a list of 
human rights to be adopted internationally, I argue is necessary to best ensure her security 
and enable her to stand at an equal position to her male compatriots. When the 
particularities of a woman's embodiment are sufficiently accounted for she is increasingly 
capable of better realizing her society endowed liberties and freedoms. Generally 
speaking, humans are captive to varying levels embodiment. From birth we are dependent 
on our primary caretakers, when we are subject to debilitating illness again such 
dependencies may appear in one's life time, as we enter into the later years in life the 
realization of our own bodily vulnerability and dependency on the care of others may 
become apparent, sometimes in conflict with the ability of our minds. Given this general 
human dependency, our disposition to be social creatures, a basic need to give and 
receive care should perhaps be added to Rawls's account. Genuine respect for the basic 
need of bodily non-interference, leading to the right to self-preservation that at times may 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 110. 
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only be realized through the support of others should be accounted for. The recognition of 
our natural dependencies, both emotional and biological, through our human embodiment 
presents us with a need to guarantee that such dependencies will not be exploited. 
Explicit rights that will account for vulnerability so as to prevent victimization must be 
included on Rawls's list if we are to consider it robust and sufficient. 
Typically such recognition of our embodiment and dependency needs are 
reflected in human rights doctrines and on Rawls's list by stipulations of personal 
security. This vague notion, however provides individuals with the rights to claim 
assistance to prevent premature death, for instance with the right to age with dignity. 
More specifically, bodily non-interference, self-preservation, a right to chose life's 
pursuits or formulate a reasonable life plan, for a woman, necessarily entails, I believe, 
having reproductive choice and control over her body and its reproductive cycles at her 
discretion. This would result in a necessary commitment on governments and other 
agencies to provide adequate education and advocacy in relation to women's specific 
health and social issues such as sexual health, family planning, birth control, breast 
cancer prevention, rape and abuse prevention, women's empowerment, relationship 
counselling, and so on for both men and women. Taking seriously the claim to personal 
security and bodily non-interference also places certain demands on a people to ensure 
that women, and all individual citizens for that matter, can partake in civic life, education, 
meaningful work, participate politically without the fear or the threat of violence and 
discrimination. 
When we begin to confront issues of women's embodiment, control over and 
choice in regards to one's reproduction has great impact on the life choices and the ability 
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to pursue one's life plan as a women. Despite the noble effort on Rawls's part to attempt 
to account for the division of labour in the household and in childrearing, his Law of 
Peoples leave too much space for the work of women to continue to go uncompensated 
for. It does not remain clear that the ability to support one's self financially through 
dignified work if able and to hold some personal property would be equally held for 
women. Given that far too much of the world's economy is made on the backs of women 
from the unfair division of labour at home in childrearing and household duties, and that 
all too often women are used as human cargo and commodities trafficked in the sex trade, 
an ideal model of human rights must clearly state such protections. The meagre 
stipulation that a sufficient amount of liberty of conscience to ensure freedom of religion 
and thought does not demand enough in regards to the women of Rawls's Society of 
Peoples. Freedom of conscience, I argue expresses the need to adequate education as 
thoughts and choices do not appear free if uninformed, indoctrinated, or made in 
ignorance. A decent society then, should seek to set up institutions of education that 
preserve the values of the given culture, while making room for social progress and 
dissent as previously discussed, but in addition to this having a curriculum catered to the 
advancement of women and the protection of their status as equals should also follow. 
Within the confines of this last section I have sought to argue that Rawls gives us 
a solid, potentially robust, yet not quite sufficient account of basic needs and human 
rights in support of his duty of assistance. It has been my intention to show that with a 
few additional requirements, such as a sufficient right to freedom of expression, 
association, and political participation, Rawls's model of human rights may not appear as 
See Rawls, John. "Public Reason Revisited", on the Family As Part of the Basic Structure, 159-163. 
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meagre. A stronger assertion of the position of women within the Society of Peoples 
additionally adds to the robustness of Rawls's account and may stifle some of the harsh 
criticisms presented by his cosmopolitan critics. For if we make space for the avenues of 
a quiet revolution through peaceful protest and expressions of dissent through 
demonstration, and additionally account for our own vulnerabilities through embodiment, 
especially with a focus on the plight of women, the adequate and much needed channels 
for change and progress will be in place. After all, it is Rawls's hope, that the Society of 
Peoples - be it the realistic Utopia it aspires to be - will provide others with the political 
will and inspiration to move toward becoming a liberal democratic people equally 
respected in the Society of Peoples and who's citizens are free and equal individuals. I 
assert that this aspiration is not possible in the absence of these additional considerations. 
Tolerating the Intolerable? 
Despite my efforts to fully flush out the meaning of basic needs, Rawls's 
cosmopolitan critics will continue to push for their conception of liberal equality. Those, 
like Tan, will hold that Rawls has wrongfully over-committed himself to the liberal value 
of toleration while undervaluing the liberal commitment to individual liberty in his Law 
of Peoples. Let us not lose sight of the view that liberal cosmopolitans hold broadly: "that 
a just global arrangement is one in which the basic liberties and democratic rights of all 
individuals are protected".83 It follows, from this view, that the cosmopolitans argue that 
nonliberal decent societies fail to merit liberal toleration, given their failure to exhibit 
individual equality between all members of their society. The cosmopolitans hold that so 
long as there are inequalities so too will there be exploitation and oppression. 
Tan, Kok-Chor. "The Problem of Decent Peoples", 76. 
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It appears that perhaps we have reached a potential liberal impasse, where the 
liberal challenge of a realistic Utopia lies somewhere between the commitment to 
individual liberty and toleration. 
Tan explains that a central issue in the Law of Peoples is "how to balance the 
protection of individual liberty with the toleration of diversity".84 Tan expresses that 
Rawls's limit of toleration is wrongly placed. The cosmopolitan limit of international 
toleration will be defined not merely by respect for basic human rights but also for liberal 
rights. Alternatively, as Tan explains, "the category of universally basic human rights 
must be expanded to include other common important liberal rights - such as the rights to 
political participation, equal political representation, equal liberty of conscience, and so 
on - that Rawls's own understanding of human rights leaves out".85 The problem of 
tolerating decent peoples and not upholding universal liberal rights, Tan identifies "is that 
it lets down dissenting individual members in these nonliberal societies". At a glance 
Rawls seems overly preoccupied with worries of parochialism and liberal paternalism. 
Contrary to this, his cosmopolitan critics are concerned more so, they claim, about 
individuals whose liberties and liberal freedoms are denied by their own state. 
The cosmopolitans claim that Rawls's preoccupation with avoiding parochialism 
provides an insufficient model of international justice in that his Law of Peoples offers 
inadequate support of individuals within decent societies whose liberal rights and 
freedoms are being denied. Rawls's account of toleration and accommodation of decent 
peoples does not offer a satisfactory response to his cosmopolitan critics in that "it fails to 
Tan, Kok-Chor. "The Problem of Decent Peoples", 76. 
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offer sufficient protection to individuals in decent societies whose aspirations to become 
free and equal persons are being thwarted by their state". Their chief complaint to 
backup such claims is that the role that Rawls assigns to individual dissent among decent 
peoples is insufficient. They admit that Rawls recognizes the presence of individual 
dissent in decent societies, "but the problem is that Rawls allows the exercise of dissent 
to be limited by the hierarchical arrangement of the society in accordance with its 
common good conception of justice".88 Recall that while individuals qua citizens are free 
and equal in a liberal society, individuals are not so regarded in a decent hierarchical 
society. Individuals are seen first as members of associations and corporations and these 
associations and corporations represent their political rights and interests. 
This is problematic, accuses Tan as "it is not ruled out, for example, that in a 
decent society, a women enjoys no direct political representation; her interests (if 
effectively possible) may be represented by, say, the male head of her household rather 
than directly by herself'.89 Tan has us imagine a decent society in which women who 
wish to question their subordinate political position in society may do so, but only 
through their corporate representatives (e.g., male head of households, or religious 
leaders or tribal leaders) as determined by the decent hierarchical (nonegalitarian) social 
structure of said people.90 Given this, Tan argues that to say that the exercise of dissent is 
adequately permitted in this case appears paradoxical. For it follows that the structure of 
expressing dissent is constrained by the hierarchical values of the society that are 
themselves the very sources of contention. This paradox presents a potential deficiency in 
87
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Rawls's Law of Peoples, for to assume away dissent aimed precisely at the hierarchical 
basic structure of so-called decent societies is to assume away the relevance or usefulness 
of the subject of justice.91 
From this it is it follows that the problem of decent peoples, then, presents the 
question of how to accommodate and permit individual dissent in nonliberal societies. To 
counter this worry raised by Tan I have already argued for the additional rights of a 
sufficient measure of freedom of expression, association and political participation. 
Recall that as political culture is a virtue that is all important for Rawls in determining 
how well a people will fare, I assert that to best contribute to the building of'common 
sympathies' and a truly shared conception of justice informed by public reason avenues 
for individual and group dissent through peaceful protest, contentious objection, public 
discourse and debate must occur within even decent hierarchical societies. We cannot 
allow Rawls's critics to deemphasize or deflate Rawls's final aim that all peoples within 
the Society of Peoples will one day become well ordered, and most likely liberal and be 
regarded as equal members in the Society of Peoples. This final aim makes necessary the 
case for social progress, which is only possible through permitting dissent, the allowance 
of deliberative forms to discuss how to best settle our reasonable disagreements, and by 
making space for social criticism to be voiced by individuals, state representatives, and 
other non-governmental organizations to accurately inform and contribute to public 
reason. 
In addition to this I have argued that women cannot be held as political hostages, 
subject to the will of their husbands, religious leaders, or state figures; however, well 
Tan, Kok-Chor. "The Problem of Decent Peoples", 85. 
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intended or well natured these beneficent heads of households or benevolent political 
figures may be. A just Society of Peoples must seek to empower women, ensure their 
security, and guarantee their representation. Women, regardless of their citizenship, must 
be afforded, I have argued, what is necessary to live independently if so chosen given her 
capabilities, decide her own life path, and to be able to assert her political rights and 
freedoms within her community. Additionally, she must also be equipped with the 
capabilities to support herself, family and other dependents if need be or if chosen and 
without fear of persecution. Women, and more inclusively speaking spouses and or life 
partners, need to have the support and the ability to freely leave abusive and hostile 
domestic circumstances. Those who are faced with such difficult circumstances must 
have the security and support of their community and family, so as not to fear becoming a 
victim of violence, living a life of shame, destitution, discrimination, and marginalization 
for both her, her children, and her other dependents. If a husband or partner dies 
prematurely, being widowed should not result in a life sentencing for the woman, her 
children and the other dependents she supports. By denying women proper political 
recognition - depriving women of a voice in political decision making, withholding the 
rights to own and inherit property, the preventing of her from having the opportunity to 
earn her own keep, refusing her of an education, and stripping her of the means to live 
independently, and inadequately taking seriously her bodily safety - such deprivations are 
obviously not to the advantage of any woman, nor to the advantage any society. I have 
argued that it would be fully unreasonable and outside of ideal theory to have half of the 
population of given society oppressed in such a way, with little room to have their voices 
heard or the power to exhibit their dissenting will. It would hardly be advantageous and 
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quite ill measured to have half the population (the female population) oppressively 
dependent and reliant on a small portion of the workforce (as gender equality means 
having 100 percent of your human resources available), and furthermore to have half the 
population unable to effectively express their political will and insignificantly contribute 
to the social and political culture of their society and its progress. So to say that a decent 
people would be permitted to subjugate its women to the role that Tan assigns them 
would disqualify such a people as decent on my account and I would hold on Rawls's 
account too. Again, decent peoples must ensure that basic needs and human rights are 
secured in such a way so that citizens are able to take advantage of such liberties, live a 
reasonably chosen life path, and actively participate and contribute to the civic life of the 
society in question. 
Perhaps I can entertain the possibility that Rawls's preoccupation with 
parochialism and his fidelity to liberal toleration is somewhat misplaced in his Law of 
Peoples. Yet, if I am to entertain such ideas, it is not only fair to wonder whether the 
cosmopolitan fixation with equality and liberal freedoms among free and equal peoples in 
Rawls's Society of Peoples may also be ill measured, however admirable. Tan urges that a 
Law of Peoples that claims to be an extension of a liberal conception of justice has to 
remain steadfast in its commitment to liberalism, and this means embracing the strong 
cosmopolitan view that individual well-being is ultimate.92 Contrary to this recall that, 
Rawls holds that the Law of Peoples founded on the cosmopolitan ideal that individuals 
are to be considered free and equal would make the Law "too narrow" and that nonliberal 
Tan, Kok-Chor. "The Problem of Decent Peoples", 88. 
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peoples would object to viewing individuals as the ultimate concern. With that said, it 
seems that from both the Rawlsian stand point and the cosmopolitan position what is of 
great concern when constructing an ideal theory of global justice is to consider the worlds 
worst off and least advantaged. Ultimately minimizing marginalization and ensuring that 
no one is left behind or on the fringe is what is of crucial importance. Whether Rawls's 
account of global sufficiency given his Law of Peoples further secured by his duty of 
assistance takes us far enough provided his framework or should we ask for more among 
his Society of Peoples in light of the cosmopolitan critique must be addressed. 
Recall that at Rawls's threshold of sufficiency individuals are able at the minimum 
to make and pursue a reasonable life plan given their individual capabilities and ability to 
make affective the rights and liberties of their society. Life at Rawls's threshold may be 
considered neither a flourishing nor a privileged life, but it is one that anyone can come 
to reasonably expect and be secure and dignified in living. Those who just meet the 
threshold can be comfortable and confident in their social position. They are free from 
being preoccupied with fears and insecurities of living in oppression, isolation, 
destitution, and malnutrition. On Rawls's account individuals represented by a decent 
people have enough to enjoy their society's rights and liberties as basic needs have been 
met. These individuals, as I have argued, additionally have the rights and means to test 
the boundaries of their liberties, to question the social order in which they find 
themselves, and can participate in social movements that would better help to exhibit and 
contribute to the common conception of justice shared within their society. Given that 
Rawls's Law of Peoples is set up to provide stability for the right reasons, it follows that 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 59, 82-3, 30-5. 
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the duty of assistance can be considered a sufficient measure of justice, if this above is 
what it entails. For it is not the case that the duty of assistance, which provides burdened 
peoples with enough to become well ordered and their individuals with enough to meet 
their basic needs is targeted at aiding a people simply to prevent a turbulent and 
tumultuous revolt. Rather, the duty of assistance's target is aimed to provide just enough 
for a people and its individuals so that they can determine their own path of social 
progress, begin their own quiet and peaceful revolution toward becoming well ordered, if 
not fully liberal. The duty enables social progress, feeds the political will of a burdened 
people that has been stifled by unfortunate circumstances, thus making it a robust and 
sufficient measure of justice within Rawls's Law of Peoples. 
The cosmopolitans appear much too pessimistic about the priority Rawls places 
on peoples to be self-determining. For, both between individual citizens and among 
peoples they conjecture that equality must be achieved in terms of rights, liberties, 
opportunities, and resources or else manipulation and oppression shall persist. I challenge 
rather, that should it not be the case that we can hold some sufficient equalities as 
necessary and invaluable, such as being considered an equal member of Rawls's society 
of peoples with the right to self determination constrained by the fulfilment of basic 
needs and essential human rights. Additionally, as far as individual citizens are concerned 
one could argue that there are certain inalienable equalities, such as gender equality, and 
those liberties that enable a person to lead a reasonable life of their choosing, participate 
in the civic culture of his or her society, such as equal opportunity of education, a 
sufficient freedom of conscience, a requisite level of freedom of expression, and a true 
sense of personal bodily security, as previously argued for. However, holding this belief 
113 
does not entail or require a full principle of global economic redistribution as Tan and the 
other cosmopolitans purport. Rather, the duty of assistance as a principle of justice covers 
the priority of such measures of equality to an appropriate threshold that does not require 
additional distributions beyond such. Arguably, further distributions beyond these 
essential equalities could create on the one hand inefficiencies - in redistributing goods, 
resources, benefits that hold little priority or importance, as what is the significance in 
redistributing wealth between millionaires and billionaires - and on the other hand, could 
result in a perverse race to the bottom as identified by the levelling down objection.94 
Equality cannot always be a decisive consideration, however valuable it may be in and of 
itself. In instances of scarcity that requires the enactment of the duty of assistance where 
we are concerned with ensuring that the citizens of a burdened people have enough, 
egalitarian principles initially seem inappropriate, as there are weighty instrumental 
reasons that must take priority to get everyone above a certain threshold of sustainability 
and well-being. 
This consideration, however worthwhile, still does little in regards to undermining 
the core egalitarian conviction that holds that even if sufficiency is achievable and 
attained equality still matters in the distribution of either noncritical benefits or the 
opportunity to enjoy critical benefits. At this crucial impasse, now that we have come to 
understand what Rawls's basic needs entail I assert that it is fair to say that he has 
sufficiently built in a robust threshold that enables citizens to enjoy the critical benefits 
that the cosmopolitans speak of. Recall that entrenched in Rawls's definition of a realistic 
Utopia is the understanding that such a society of peoples could and may exist, but more 
For a more in depth discussion of the levelling down objection see Casal, Paula."Why Sufficiency Is 
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importantly it is also Utopian in that such circumstances are highly desirable because it 
joins reasonableness and justice with conditions enabling citizens to realize their 
fundamental interests. 
Even though there is a target and a cut-off for the duty of assistance, and it 
operates much closer to the principle of just savings, rather than the difference principle, I 
have argued that it is perhaps unfair to hold that Rawls has abandoned his previous liberal 
commitments argued for in his earlier works. I have attempted to demonstrate that at a 
quick glance it may appear that Rawls has been inconsistent in his theorizing as his 
cosmopolitan critics have charged. Yet when we begin to dig below the surface of Rawls's 
account and resurrect his deeply entrenched terms, I have sought to show that it is 
possible to charitably construct the Law of Peoples in such a way that it reads as a robust 
and sufficient account of global justice within its given framework. When we look to the 
themes of political culture and civic life being all important to Rawls in addressing how 
well a people will fare, his commitment to ensuring that citizens, and certainly the least 
advantaged, are justly and adequately accounted for persists in The Law of Peoples and 
admirably so. Despite Rawls's retraction from arguing for full liberal egalitarian rights 
and distributions it is notable that he seeks to protect the least advantaged in such a way 
that adequately addresses issues of exclusion, persecution, isolation, and oppression 
ensuring that no one is to be left destitute and hungry on the fringe of civil society. It is at 
this threshold that Rawls has secured the crucial benefits that afford citizens the ability to 
enjoy their rights and liberties and take part in the civic life and culture of their society. 
From such a position as we have seen, citizens and groups can actively contribute 
through debate, deliberation, and other public forms to the overall sense of public good 
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and justice. Rawls has put in place the necessary mechanisms within his Law of Peoples 
that make room for social progress, nation building if you will, of a given society that is 
self determined and informed by the public sense of reason and shared conception of 
justice. In my pursuit of reconstructing and reconsidering Rawls, I have intended to 
demonstrate that although it may superficially appear that he has abandoned his strong 
liberal commitment to equality, he has more so remained steadfast to his liberal tradition 
of balancing diverse and competing values of toleration, equality, self-determination, 
autonomy, and liberty. Much of Rawls's reasoning begins with his acknowledgement of 
the pains of reasonable pluralism and the need to make space for overlapping consensus 
and his fidelity to these considerations is continued in his Law of Peoples. 
Conclusion 
Pre-emptively, I intend that my addition of some minimal and sufficient 
conditions of liberty of expression, association, and political participation would combat 
some of the worries expressed by the cosmopolitan egalitarians as relayed in chapter two. 
Much of their concern, and I would agree, correctly so relates to the plight of future 
generations, the position of women, and the world's worst off. Their concern expresses 
that despite Rawls's insistence on securing basic needs and urgent human rights there 
remains too much room for inequality and that exploitation and oppression will persist on 
Rawls's account. It has been my intention to show that this need not be the case, that once 
we consider that basic needs express both provisions to prevent death from hunger and 
disease in addition to the means to make meaningful use of rights and liberties of the 
inhabited society, it is possible to view basic needs as robust and sufficient. When we add 
the demands of basic needs to the significance placed on taking human rights seriously 
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the duty of assistance continues to look much more like a duty of justice and not a 
meagre stipulation of foreign aid. The duty of assistance is perhaps a demand that is 
narrow in focus, in that it has a defined target and cut-off, but it is wide and deep in scope 
as it seeks to secure what is necessary for individuals to lead what they individually 
define as dignified lives of their choosing. Additionally the duty nourishes the political 
will of a once burdened people and makes room for their social progress toward 
becoming well ordered in a self-determinate way. 
It is important to recall then, that the Law of Peoples is designed for the ideal case 
of well-ordered societies joined into a well-ordered Society of Peoples. As we have 
explored, the Law of Peoples imposes a duty on peoples to meet the basic substantial and 
economic conditions that enable all peoples to be politically autonomous and 
independent. When we attach this duty to the commitment to honour human rights for 
their own sake, these and other requirements mentioned should protect less-advantaged 
peoples from being corrupted by powerful political and economic interests abroad. In 
conclusion, I have sought to demonstrate that it is important to recognize and appreciate 
Rawls's initial intentions for constructing The Law of Peoples as such. Additionally, it is 
crucial to acknowledge Rawls's framework that constrains his intent. For, the end of the 
Law of Peoples is equal political autonomy, or "the equal freedom and equality of a 
people as members of the Society of well-ordered Peoples".95 Perhaps it is the 'ideal' 
language used of a 'realistic Utopia' that intuitively pushes us to demand more from 
Rawls. I admit that we can also feel dissatisfied with his account in that it does not do 
enough to meet the immediacy of the issue of poverty eradication and global injustice as 
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 118. 
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we so experience today. Despite these concerns, I have sought to show that when we 
allow ourselves to be situated within Rawls's ideal society of peoples, we can reasonably 
accept the duty of assistance as a robust and reasonably sufficient demand. 
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